"Social conservatives are the populists most motivated by religious moral issues." I think you misread things here. I would say that the single biggest issue by far amongst Social Conservatives (college educated or not, religious or not) - and even if they would be wary of saying it out loud - is their frustration at how the LBGTQXYZ politico agenda has been relentlessly rammed down their throats by the liberal establishment and (more limply) by their own conservative politicians.
"There are those who would argue that for a long time this country was governed by a bipartisan elite consensus. This combined the conservatives elites on the Republican side with moderate Democrats. Eventually, their mistakes and arrogance ended up alienating too many Americans."
I think this misses the most important reason for the collapse of the bipartisan consensus: the browning of the American electorate + the extremely left-wing Millennial cohort allowed Democrats to move to the left, and forced Republicans to pick up working-class whites and white ethnics (which required dropping much of the anti-welfare/govt-spending platform) to compete.
"Social conservatives are the populists most motivated by religious moral issues."
Are you sure? I would consider myself to be socially conservative, but not a populist.
Specifically, I believe that my "social conservatism" is primarily a matter for me, my family, and the community with which we associate. I think it is difficult, and even perhaps a mistake, to strive to create a moral society from the top down rather than the bottom up, i.e., the private sphere seems to be the seed from which a moral society grows.
Politically, however, I lean libertarian in the sense that -- whatever my personal morality dictates -- I think individual liberty should be maximized to the extent feasible and the government's role should be as limited as possible.
Re: "recent trends have weakened the erstwhile elites of both parties."
There are persistent countervailing trends that continue to strengthen and unify elites across parties: globalization, innovations in technology (big tech, AI, Zoom), education at selective universities, regulatory dynamics (e.g., finance, pharma, energy, tech platforms -- rent-seeking, lobbying, capture).
True, abortion and immigration are major hot-button issues. However, elites have broad interests, norms, and policy preferences in common. They engage in drama at a few salient margins.
I had heard the term Rockefeller Republican before but never really looked up Nelson Rockefeller. So I did and especially his primary run against Goldwater.
Rockefeller lost the primary because it came out that he had an affair that created a child and divorced his wife to be with a younger woman. I notice this pattern with Rockefeller republican types. David brooks and Charles Murray both traded in their first wives for young units.
It’s really hard to follow the success sequence if you’re screwing around. But that precisely what a lot of these Rockefeller republican types wanted. Some youthful indiscretions, a mistress, a younger second wife. Maybe abortion if something goes wrong. That’s their “success sequence”. When regular people try that though we get a lot of single mothers.
On the public policy front he was basically a tax and spend liberal who left New York in pretty bad place by the 1970s.
For all the talk of trumps shamelessness, he’s a Rockefeller republican through and through.
Whenever we refer to populist movements (i.e., the "social conservatives" and the "cultural conservatives" here) there is a bit of ambiguity because the base is basically the same. It's just that the leadership or the rhetoric they use can vary. And the leadership are all elites. Elites differ more than the base in their strategies. Some elites want to gain an edge by cooperating with other elites, and some elites want to gain an edge by cooperating with the lower classes. Some try to appeal to advantaged lower classes (i.e., white workers) and some appeal to disadvantaged lower classes. Some try to win via business, some via political connections.
Well, I suppose there is no law against assigning the label “populist” to the holders of whatever policy positions one happens to be opposed to. But that doesn’t seem to be a particularly rigorous approach to understanding the conflicting intuitions that need to be accommodated in order to progress and move beyond oppression and resistance. I would propose an understanding of populism as a philosophical intuition deeply rooted in history that has continually engaged with anti-populist intuitions for millennia in many different cultures throughout the world.
Populism, at least as I conceive of it, is rooted in the opposing intuitions of the fear of the many of the rule of the few versus the anti-populism rooted in the fear of the few of the rule of the many. In the Western tradition, we might choose to start with perhaps the first great Western populist, Solon, in around 600 BC., who, introduced a constitution much more moderate than that of Draco who had preceded him. Lord Acton wrote:
“Solon was not only the wisest man to be found in Athens, but the most profound political genius of antiquity; and the easy, bloodless, and pacific revolution by which he accomplished the deliverance of his country was the first step in a career which our age glories in pursuing, and instituted a power which has done more than anything, except revealed religion, for the regeneration of society. The upper class had possessed the right of making and administering the laws, and he left them in possession, only transferring to wealth what had been the privilege of birth. To the rich, who alone had the means of sustaining the burden of public service in taxation and war, Solon gave a share of power proportioned to the demands made on their resources. The poorest classes were exempt from direct taxes, but were excluded from office. Solon gave them a voice in electing magistrates from the classes above them, and the right of calling them to account. This concession, apparently so slender, was the beginning of a mighty change. It introduced the idea that a man ought to have a voice in selecting those to whose rectitude and wisdom he is compelled to trust his fortune, his family, and his life. And this idea completely inverted the notion of human authority, for it inaugurated the reign of moral influence where all political power had depended on moral force. Government by consent superseded government by compulsion, and the pyramid which had stood on a point was made to stand upon its base. By making every citizen the guardian of his own interest, Solon admitted the element of Democracy into the State. The greatest glory of a ruler, he said, is to create a popular government. Believing that no man can be entirely trusted, he subjected all who exercised power to the vigilant control of those for whom they acted.”
antiquity And this is heart of populism, people advancing their welfare through their political participation. And we can trace the importance of this intuition down through the ages as it has been the wellspring from which issued the commercial revolution followed by the Protestant reformation, the counter-reformation, the industrial revolution and now the digital revolution, as individuals pursuing their personal ambitions, profit, and autonomy, created new institutions and found liberty in doing so. When this impulse and intuition fail, we find stagnancy.
The anti-populist intuition has an equally storied past with even more famous characters. Plato is known by everyone, Solon by few. “The populists killed Socrates” perhaps sums up the perpetual fear of the mob. The mob does not speak clearly and does not express its preferences clearly for any particular policy or program. The mob is subject to passions. The mob is ignorant. Democracy is inconsistent with freedom. The mob is easy to mislead. The poor will plunder the rich. The wise few will do what is best for you. A new Terror is around every corner. These refrains have been a constant down through the centuries. At times, the few do succeed in enormously beneficial ways. For example, in 2004 Chines Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping, oversaw the adoption of an amendment to the Chinese Constitution that provided: "The lawful private property of citizens shall be inviolable. The country shall protect in accordance with law citizens' private property rights and inheritance rights. The country may, as necessitated by public interest, expropriate or requisition citizens' private property and pay compensation therefor." Or, one might cite Winston Churchill’s first premiership. Or, libertarian idol Lee Kuan Yew. But the successes represented by such examples appear to be more of a vindication of Machiavelli’s belief in the wisdom of the masses than examples of the benevolence of absolutism.
Yet, there are tradeoffs and something to be said for minimizing the costs of political decision-making. Sometimes anti-populist forms of governance may get to the sweet spot. As Hannah Arendt wrote in her 1958 book The Human Condition, conceding the anti-populist intuition “It is, in fact, far easier to act under conditions of tyranny than it is to think.” But, she also suggests consistent with the populist intuition, that risky decisions and their costs might be more readily born by a population when it has reason to expect that the decision-makers' promises to offset the costs of negative consequences will be honored. As we live in an age in which the dominant institutions lean decidedly to the anti-populist intuition, their strategists might consider whether they can credibly promise security against the many high risk - high- cost policies with which they are currently infatuated and if not, perhaps reconsider a more moderate agenda.
I don't think the divisions within the Left are as stark as they are within the Right. One can hardly read the comments at a rightist blog, for instance, without seeing the word 'RINO' flung about; the people using it seem to be just as disdainful of elite conservatives as they are of leftists. I can't think of any similar epithet in widespread use on left-leaning sites, e.g., the comments sections of WaPo stories.
The out of wedlock birth rate is 40%. America has not been "governed by a bipartisan elite consensus" which holds that you should get married before you have children for at least 60 years.
He's also wrong about public support for abortion. Banning abortion after 12 weeks with exceptions is a majority position.
These elites vs. populists hot takes all seem to have trouble explaining how Nikki Haley ended being far more popular than both Biden and Trump. (I mean among all Americans, not just Republicans.) If Nikki Haley represents Republican elites, then her popularity would seem to contradict the notion that elites "ended up alienating too many Americans". If one tries to explain Haley's popularity by claiming she is a populist, then how does one explain her loss to Trump in the primaries?
It's probably worth remembering that the parties are more alienated from the mainstream than ever. The populist and activist dominance within the parties are more reflective of sorting/selection than a true populist movement among the general population. "Mainstream" is probably a more apropos term than "elite".
I’m sympathetic to social and bourgeoise values conservatism, but not to using them to mobilize for an anti-growth (high deficit, low tax, low immigration), anti-redistributionist politics. Of course, I am not sympathetic to Progressives’ anti-growth (high deficit, high regulation) policies, either.
Hence: Radical Centrist: (100) Substack Home - Radical Centrist
Conservatives more divided than their opponents? The Left's coalition of the fringes (hat tip: Steve Sailer) are a wildly disparate group of grift seekers held together only by a ginned up hatred of core Americans whom they disparage as racists, white supremacists, misogynists, homophobes, etc., etc. Just now that coalition is in turmoil over the intra-Left outpouring of anti-Semitism (masquerading as anti-Zionism) against their Jewish component.
"Social conservatives are the populists most motivated by religious moral issues." I think you misread things here. I would say that the single biggest issue by far amongst Social Conservatives (college educated or not, religious or not) - and even if they would be wary of saying it out loud - is their frustration at how the LBGTQXYZ politico agenda has been relentlessly rammed down their throats by the liberal establishment and (more limply) by their own conservative politicians.
"There are those who would argue that for a long time this country was governed by a bipartisan elite consensus. This combined the conservatives elites on the Republican side with moderate Democrats. Eventually, their mistakes and arrogance ended up alienating too many Americans."
I think this misses the most important reason for the collapse of the bipartisan consensus: the browning of the American electorate + the extremely left-wing Millennial cohort allowed Democrats to move to the left, and forced Republicans to pick up working-class whites and white ethnics (which required dropping much of the anti-welfare/govt-spending platform) to compete.
"Social conservatives are the populists most motivated by religious moral issues."
Are you sure? I would consider myself to be socially conservative, but not a populist.
Specifically, I believe that my "social conservatism" is primarily a matter for me, my family, and the community with which we associate. I think it is difficult, and even perhaps a mistake, to strive to create a moral society from the top down rather than the bottom up, i.e., the private sphere seems to be the seed from which a moral society grows.
Politically, however, I lean libertarian in the sense that -- whatever my personal morality dictates -- I think individual liberty should be maximized to the extent feasible and the government's role should be as limited as possible.
"Open borders is the hill the Wall Street Journal editorial page would die on."
I don't know who he is but that guy just shot up a notch.
Re: "recent trends have weakened the erstwhile elites of both parties."
There are persistent countervailing trends that continue to strengthen and unify elites across parties: globalization, innovations in technology (big tech, AI, Zoom), education at selective universities, regulatory dynamics (e.g., finance, pharma, energy, tech platforms -- rent-seeking, lobbying, capture).
True, abortion and immigration are major hot-button issues. However, elites have broad interests, norms, and policy preferences in common. They engage in drama at a few salient margins.
Or maybe I am miss the trees for the forest?
I had heard the term Rockefeller Republican before but never really looked up Nelson Rockefeller. So I did and especially his primary run against Goldwater.
Rockefeller lost the primary because it came out that he had an affair that created a child and divorced his wife to be with a younger woman. I notice this pattern with Rockefeller republican types. David brooks and Charles Murray both traded in their first wives for young units.
It’s really hard to follow the success sequence if you’re screwing around. But that precisely what a lot of these Rockefeller republican types wanted. Some youthful indiscretions, a mistress, a younger second wife. Maybe abortion if something goes wrong. That’s their “success sequence”. When regular people try that though we get a lot of single mothers.
On the public policy front he was basically a tax and spend liberal who left New York in pretty bad place by the 1970s.
For all the talk of trumps shamelessness, he’s a Rockefeller republican through and through.
"three rival visions of what tradition is to be conserved: social conservatism, cultural conservatism, and bourgeois values."
What about fiscal conservatives?
Whenever we refer to populist movements (i.e., the "social conservatives" and the "cultural conservatives" here) there is a bit of ambiguity because the base is basically the same. It's just that the leadership or the rhetoric they use can vary. And the leadership are all elites. Elites differ more than the base in their strategies. Some elites want to gain an edge by cooperating with other elites, and some elites want to gain an edge by cooperating with the lower classes. Some try to appeal to advantaged lower classes (i.e., white workers) and some appeal to disadvantaged lower classes. Some try to win via business, some via political connections.
Well, I suppose there is no law against assigning the label “populist” to the holders of whatever policy positions one happens to be opposed to. But that doesn’t seem to be a particularly rigorous approach to understanding the conflicting intuitions that need to be accommodated in order to progress and move beyond oppression and resistance. I would propose an understanding of populism as a philosophical intuition deeply rooted in history that has continually engaged with anti-populist intuitions for millennia in many different cultures throughout the world.
Populism, at least as I conceive of it, is rooted in the opposing intuitions of the fear of the many of the rule of the few versus the anti-populism rooted in the fear of the few of the rule of the many. In the Western tradition, we might choose to start with perhaps the first great Western populist, Solon, in around 600 BC., who, introduced a constitution much more moderate than that of Draco who had preceded him. Lord Acton wrote:
“Solon was not only the wisest man to be found in Athens, but the most profound political genius of antiquity; and the easy, bloodless, and pacific revolution by which he accomplished the deliverance of his country was the first step in a career which our age glories in pursuing, and instituted a power which has done more than anything, except revealed religion, for the regeneration of society. The upper class had possessed the right of making and administering the laws, and he left them in possession, only transferring to wealth what had been the privilege of birth. To the rich, who alone had the means of sustaining the burden of public service in taxation and war, Solon gave a share of power proportioned to the demands made on their resources. The poorest classes were exempt from direct taxes, but were excluded from office. Solon gave them a voice in electing magistrates from the classes above them, and the right of calling them to account. This concession, apparently so slender, was the beginning of a mighty change. It introduced the idea that a man ought to have a voice in selecting those to whose rectitude and wisdom he is compelled to trust his fortune, his family, and his life. And this idea completely inverted the notion of human authority, for it inaugurated the reign of moral influence where all political power had depended on moral force. Government by consent superseded government by compulsion, and the pyramid which had stood on a point was made to stand upon its base. By making every citizen the guardian of his own interest, Solon admitted the element of Democracy into the State. The greatest glory of a ruler, he said, is to create a popular government. Believing that no man can be entirely trusted, he subjected all who exercised power to the vigilant control of those for whom they acted.”
-The History of Freedom in Antiquity (1877) https://www.acton.org/research/history-freedom-
antiquity And this is heart of populism, people advancing their welfare through their political participation. And we can trace the importance of this intuition down through the ages as it has been the wellspring from which issued the commercial revolution followed by the Protestant reformation, the counter-reformation, the industrial revolution and now the digital revolution, as individuals pursuing their personal ambitions, profit, and autonomy, created new institutions and found liberty in doing so. When this impulse and intuition fail, we find stagnancy.
The anti-populist intuition has an equally storied past with even more famous characters. Plato is known by everyone, Solon by few. “The populists killed Socrates” perhaps sums up the perpetual fear of the mob. The mob does not speak clearly and does not express its preferences clearly for any particular policy or program. The mob is subject to passions. The mob is ignorant. Democracy is inconsistent with freedom. The mob is easy to mislead. The poor will plunder the rich. The wise few will do what is best for you. A new Terror is around every corner. These refrains have been a constant down through the centuries. At times, the few do succeed in enormously beneficial ways. For example, in 2004 Chines Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping, oversaw the adoption of an amendment to the Chinese Constitution that provided: "The lawful private property of citizens shall be inviolable. The country shall protect in accordance with law citizens' private property rights and inheritance rights. The country may, as necessitated by public interest, expropriate or requisition citizens' private property and pay compensation therefor." Or, one might cite Winston Churchill’s first premiership. Or, libertarian idol Lee Kuan Yew. But the successes represented by such examples appear to be more of a vindication of Machiavelli’s belief in the wisdom of the masses than examples of the benevolence of absolutism.
Yet, there are tradeoffs and something to be said for minimizing the costs of political decision-making. Sometimes anti-populist forms of governance may get to the sweet spot. As Hannah Arendt wrote in her 1958 book The Human Condition, conceding the anti-populist intuition “It is, in fact, far easier to act under conditions of tyranny than it is to think.” But, she also suggests consistent with the populist intuition, that risky decisions and their costs might be more readily born by a population when it has reason to expect that the decision-makers' promises to offset the costs of negative consequences will be honored. As we live in an age in which the dominant institutions lean decidedly to the anti-populist intuition, their strategists might consider whether they can credibly promise security against the many high risk - high- cost policies with which they are currently infatuated and if not, perhaps reconsider a more moderate agenda.
Check out Ayaan Hirsi Ali on substack!
I don't think the divisions within the Left are as stark as they are within the Right. One can hardly read the comments at a rightist blog, for instance, without seeing the word 'RINO' flung about; the people using it seem to be just as disdainful of elite conservatives as they are of leftists. I can't think of any similar epithet in widespread use on left-leaning sites, e.g., the comments sections of WaPo stories.
“Eventually, their mistakes and arrogance ended up alienating too many Americans.”
What are their biggest mistakes?
Kling is simply wrong on the facts.
The out of wedlock birth rate is 40%. America has not been "governed by a bipartisan elite consensus" which holds that you should get married before you have children for at least 60 years.
He's also wrong about public support for abortion. Banning abortion after 12 weeks with exceptions is a majority position.
These elites vs. populists hot takes all seem to have trouble explaining how Nikki Haley ended being far more popular than both Biden and Trump. (I mean among all Americans, not just Republicans.) If Nikki Haley represents Republican elites, then her popularity would seem to contradict the notion that elites "ended up alienating too many Americans". If one tries to explain Haley's popularity by claiming she is a populist, then how does one explain her loss to Trump in the primaries?
It's probably worth remembering that the parties are more alienated from the mainstream than ever. The populist and activist dominance within the parties are more reflective of sorting/selection than a true populist movement among the general population. "Mainstream" is probably a more apropos term than "elite".
I’m sympathetic to social and bourgeoise values conservatism, but not to using them to mobilize for an anti-growth (high deficit, low tax, low immigration), anti-redistributionist politics. Of course, I am not sympathetic to Progressives’ anti-growth (high deficit, high regulation) policies, either.
Hence: Radical Centrist: (100) Substack Home - Radical Centrist
Conservatives more divided than their opponents? The Left's coalition of the fringes (hat tip: Steve Sailer) are a wildly disparate group of grift seekers held together only by a ginned up hatred of core Americans whom they disparage as racists, white supremacists, misogynists, homophobes, etc., etc. Just now that coalition is in turmoil over the intra-Left outpouring of anti-Semitism (masquerading as anti-Zionism) against their Jewish component.