So I watched the podcast, and here is my $0.02. I'm not going to comment on Robert Wright's conversation style, or the merit of each person's arguments. But I did observe the following. This is the first time I've seen Russ Roberts in what I would describe as a debate-like setting. As I recall, in the opening 15 minutes or so of that podcast, Robert Wright made about 3 or 4 statements/questions. Russ Roberts remembered every point, responded to each one in a coherent and compelling way, and I think in the process he even reordered the sequence of subjects to match the flow of his response. And he kept doing this during the entire 2-hour podcast. I was so impressed that at first I thought Roberts must be taking notes. So I watched the podcast a second time, and nope Roberts had not been taking notes.
My point is that, in my opinion and at least in this particular podcast, Roberts was in top form. I think part of what we saw may have been the challenge of almost any human being (it happened to be Robert Wright in this case) keeping pace with Russ Roberts. Wright strikes me as a very skilled debater, but I think he had his hands full with Russ Roberts.
Blaming America first is indeed a very common reaction, also in my own experience listening to Bob Wright and similar thinkers. However, there's another prevalent bias: the substantial overestimation of America's role and influence in general. This bias is not unique to them. NC-s also overestimate American influence, though their perspectives may differ. For instance, MH might argue that America's role and influence are significant and negative, while NC may view them as significant and positive. In reality, in many instances, whether American influence is bad or good is irrelevant because this influence is minor, insignificant, or nonexistent.
One specific example from the pre-2022 Russian-Ukrainian relations. The most important diplomatic effort was the so-called Minsk Process and Minsk agreements, which were multi-year diplomatic negotiations between Ukraine and Russia to resolve the issue of Russia-backed separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. To understand how the 2022 war started, its causes, and what preceded it, one needs in-depth knowledge about the Minsk Process.
In several of his conversations, Bob Wright referred to the Minsk Process. He had heard of it, but something was off when I listened to him; initially, I wasn't sure what was going on. But then, during another conversation, everything fell into place. Wright stated, “You know, the Minsk Process and Minsk Agreements. All signed it. We Americans signed it, Russia signed it, Ukraine signed it, and Ukraine did not follow through.” Essentially, he blamed Ukraine and also the US, arguing that the US, as a co-signatory, should have forced Ukraine to adhere to the Minsk Agreements.
However, Wright made a fundamental and factual mistake. The US did not sign the Minsk Agreements and had no participation in the Minsk Process. In reality, these were negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, and the separatists, mediated by France and Germany. The US played no role in it. In fact, during the Obama and Trump years, the broader perspective was that Ukraine-Russia relations were a European affair, and the European Union (de facto Germany and France) should resolve it, with the US not involved politically, diplomatically, economically, or militarily.
But Wright was unaware of this. Having heard that the Minsk Process was an important series of events before the 2022 war between Ukraine and Russia, he automatically concluded: a) it was important, so Americans must have been involved; b) as Americans were involved, our involvement must have been negative. He could not conceive the correct answer: Americans were not involved at all.
When Wright discusses Russia and Ukraine, he makes many factual mistakes. While I also disagree with his interpretations, he consistently makes plain factual errors, always in the same direction: assuming US involvement and significant influence.
But like I said. Overestimation is not unique to him and other MH-s. NC do similar mistakes even if their interpretion is different.
(Full disclosure: I am from a small Eastern European country and have my own biases. Like most Eastern Europeans, I regard Russia as a threat. Like most Eastern Europeans, I am pro-American, pro-hawkish, and support US involvement.)
There are likely many factors contributing to the overestimation bias, but in this specific instance, I would like to point to one particularly aspect.
I am simplifying, but I think basically it goes like this. If you're someone like Bob Wright, engaging with political discourse in Russia or Ukraine pre-2022, your sources are likely mainstream Western media outlets like CNN and The New York Times. This perspective does not come from within; it lacks engagement with Russian debates, Russian newspapers, Russian blogosphere, etc. Basic reporting from NYT outlets typically was smth like this „Russian politicain X said something about America.” That's the extent of the exposure. You don't see the in-depth stories of "a Russian politician engaging with another Russian politician, making arguments based on Russian thought and philosophy." This is not an indictment of the media, but rather an observation.
However, if you understand the Russian language (as I do) and have followed political events in Russia and Ukraine professionally for years, you'll find that the discourse within Russian media space is overwhelmingly domestic. "A Russian politician talking to another Russian politician about Russia" constitutes more than 99% of the discourse. The essence here is that politics is inherently local; political thought, discourse, arguments, and references are primarily influenced by local contexts.
This is not exclusive to Russia; it applies to the US and even smaller countries. Coming from a small Eastern European country myself, with a border close to Russia, I can attest that even when discussing foreign or security policy, our debates, thought processes, and references are predominantly internal, not dictated by external actors. In a vast country like Russia, this inward focus is even more pronounced.
Bob Wright, and others relying on outlets like The New York Times for their understanding, miss this nuance. They see only sporadic mentions of Russian politicians commenting on the USA and mistakenly believe this to be the Russian political discourse or at least large part of Russian discourse. In reality, these instances are just a minuscule fraction of the broader conversation.
I am about 2/3 through the podcast and I can't disagree with any of this. I generally have a pretty high regard for Bob Wright, but this is not his finest hour. Russ Roberts's equanimity in the face of it is a marvel of the world.
Regarding footnote (1); the proverbial "we" debate all the time about what the Palestinians should do. The problem is that reasonable Palestinians cannot engage in the debate because, well, Hamas or Iran would kill them.
I appreciate Bob because he's helped me to break my own asymmetric views. His podcasts with Mickey Kaus, maybe not always insightful, still force me to reevaluate my priors.
Anyway, the above is why I give him some solid latitude.
What you call an asymmetric insight, I call an experienced insight: Hamas has demonstrated over and over from all to see that it is not a good-faith actor, so there is no point in accommodating those who insist we give its partisans the benefit of doubt that has been permanently laid to rest.
What Arnold calls asymmetric insight is the evaluation of a debatable proposition by attribution of motive rather substantive analysis. Hannah Arendt pointed out long ago that much of the success of the Left was due to turning everything into a question of motive. It is obfuscatory; it can distract attention from obvious speciousness. Lefties can't or won't give up on this intellectually discreditable practice, probably because it can be quite persuasive to those who lack the mental sharpness to see it for what it is.
They "can't" give up asymmetric insights. Imaging having to prove everything from "systemic racism" to "evil capitalism" without excluding cultural, and competence considerations.
Note that your a) and b) analysis doesn't include the impacts of b) on the potential of making the international system unstable and the impossibility of peace when taking of hostages becomes the accepted norm. You have to handle international kidnapping the same way you handle local criminal kidnapping with Lindberg Laws and maximum force (including the assumption of rational actors with self-interest in survival).
With b) as a norm, the results would functionally destroy the "international community" making b) a non viable option in the future. The norm would provide most power to the most barbaric country willing to kidnap citizens as hostages and willing to kill those hostages. "Peace in our time" (Chamberland / Hitler agreement) only bought a few months before WW11 started.
With religious belief systems the self-interest in survival may not work, so even the MAD nuclear doctrine may have stability issues when Iran gets the bomb. That is really scary.
I feel like these sorts of conversations would have potentially more honest results if instead of "Palestinians and Jews" the speakers would say "Arabs and Jews". They could still have all their same views, but it would be so much plainer what people really want, and what a small area is too much for them and always will be.
Inspired by the first 10 minutes of the podcast: "If one party lacks important facts that the other party has, I would say their understanding of reality is distorted by lack of facts. All else being equal."
So I watched the podcast, and here is my $0.02. I'm not going to comment on Robert Wright's conversation style, or the merit of each person's arguments. But I did observe the following. This is the first time I've seen Russ Roberts in what I would describe as a debate-like setting. As I recall, in the opening 15 minutes or so of that podcast, Robert Wright made about 3 or 4 statements/questions. Russ Roberts remembered every point, responded to each one in a coherent and compelling way, and I think in the process he even reordered the sequence of subjects to match the flow of his response. And he kept doing this during the entire 2-hour podcast. I was so impressed that at first I thought Roberts must be taking notes. So I watched the podcast a second time, and nope Roberts had not been taking notes.
My point is that, in my opinion and at least in this particular podcast, Roberts was in top form. I think part of what we saw may have been the challenge of almost any human being (it happened to be Robert Wright in this case) keeping pace with Russ Roberts. Wright strikes me as a very skilled debater, but I think he had his hands full with Russ Roberts.
Love this comment.
Blaming America first is indeed a very common reaction, also in my own experience listening to Bob Wright and similar thinkers. However, there's another prevalent bias: the substantial overestimation of America's role and influence in general. This bias is not unique to them. NC-s also overestimate American influence, though their perspectives may differ. For instance, MH might argue that America's role and influence are significant and negative, while NC may view them as significant and positive. In reality, in many instances, whether American influence is bad or good is irrelevant because this influence is minor, insignificant, or nonexistent.
One specific example from the pre-2022 Russian-Ukrainian relations. The most important diplomatic effort was the so-called Minsk Process and Minsk agreements, which were multi-year diplomatic negotiations between Ukraine and Russia to resolve the issue of Russia-backed separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. To understand how the 2022 war started, its causes, and what preceded it, one needs in-depth knowledge about the Minsk Process.
In several of his conversations, Bob Wright referred to the Minsk Process. He had heard of it, but something was off when I listened to him; initially, I wasn't sure what was going on. But then, during another conversation, everything fell into place. Wright stated, “You know, the Minsk Process and Minsk Agreements. All signed it. We Americans signed it, Russia signed it, Ukraine signed it, and Ukraine did not follow through.” Essentially, he blamed Ukraine and also the US, arguing that the US, as a co-signatory, should have forced Ukraine to adhere to the Minsk Agreements.
However, Wright made a fundamental and factual mistake. The US did not sign the Minsk Agreements and had no participation in the Minsk Process. In reality, these were negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, and the separatists, mediated by France and Germany. The US played no role in it. In fact, during the Obama and Trump years, the broader perspective was that Ukraine-Russia relations were a European affair, and the European Union (de facto Germany and France) should resolve it, with the US not involved politically, diplomatically, economically, or militarily.
But Wright was unaware of this. Having heard that the Minsk Process was an important series of events before the 2022 war between Ukraine and Russia, he automatically concluded: a) it was important, so Americans must have been involved; b) as Americans were involved, our involvement must have been negative. He could not conceive the correct answer: Americans were not involved at all.
When Wright discusses Russia and Ukraine, he makes many factual mistakes. While I also disagree with his interpretations, he consistently makes plain factual errors, always in the same direction: assuming US involvement and significant influence.
But like I said. Overestimation is not unique to him and other MH-s. NC do similar mistakes even if their interpretion is different.
(Full disclosure: I am from a small Eastern European country and have my own biases. Like most Eastern Europeans, I regard Russia as a threat. Like most Eastern Europeans, I am pro-American, pro-hawkish, and support US involvement.)
There are likely many factors contributing to the overestimation bias, but in this specific instance, I would like to point to one particularly aspect.
I am simplifying, but I think basically it goes like this. If you're someone like Bob Wright, engaging with political discourse in Russia or Ukraine pre-2022, your sources are likely mainstream Western media outlets like CNN and The New York Times. This perspective does not come from within; it lacks engagement with Russian debates, Russian newspapers, Russian blogosphere, etc. Basic reporting from NYT outlets typically was smth like this „Russian politicain X said something about America.” That's the extent of the exposure. You don't see the in-depth stories of "a Russian politician engaging with another Russian politician, making arguments based on Russian thought and philosophy." This is not an indictment of the media, but rather an observation.
However, if you understand the Russian language (as I do) and have followed political events in Russia and Ukraine professionally for years, you'll find that the discourse within Russian media space is overwhelmingly domestic. "A Russian politician talking to another Russian politician about Russia" constitutes more than 99% of the discourse. The essence here is that politics is inherently local; political thought, discourse, arguments, and references are primarily influenced by local contexts.
This is not exclusive to Russia; it applies to the US and even smaller countries. Coming from a small Eastern European country myself, with a border close to Russia, I can attest that even when discussing foreign or security policy, our debates, thought processes, and references are predominantly internal, not dictated by external actors. In a vast country like Russia, this inward focus is even more pronounced.
Bob Wright, and others relying on outlets like The New York Times for their understanding, miss this nuance. They see only sporadic mentions of Russian politicians commenting on the USA and mistakenly believe this to be the Russian political discourse or at least large part of Russian discourse. In reality, these instances are just a minuscule fraction of the broader conversation.
I am about 2/3 through the podcast and I can't disagree with any of this. I generally have a pretty high regard for Bob Wright, but this is not his finest hour. Russ Roberts's equanimity in the face of it is a marvel of the world.
Regarding footnote (1); the proverbial "we" debate all the time about what the Palestinians should do. The problem is that reasonable Palestinians cannot engage in the debate because, well, Hamas or Iran would kill them.
I appreciate Bob because he's helped me to break my own asymmetric views. His podcasts with Mickey Kaus, maybe not always insightful, still force me to reevaluate my priors.
Anyway, the above is why I give him some solid latitude.
What you call an asymmetric insight, I call an experienced insight: Hamas has demonstrated over and over from all to see that it is not a good-faith actor, so there is no point in accommodating those who insist we give its partisans the benefit of doubt that has been permanently laid to rest.
What Arnold calls asymmetric insight is the evaluation of a debatable proposition by attribution of motive rather substantive analysis. Hannah Arendt pointed out long ago that much of the success of the Left was due to turning everything into a question of motive. It is obfuscatory; it can distract attention from obvious speciousness. Lefties can't or won't give up on this intellectually discreditable practice, probably because it can be quite persuasive to those who lack the mental sharpness to see it for what it is.
They "can't" give up asymmetric insights. Imaging having to prove everything from "systemic racism" to "evil capitalism" without excluding cultural, and competence considerations.
Note that your a) and b) analysis doesn't include the impacts of b) on the potential of making the international system unstable and the impossibility of peace when taking of hostages becomes the accepted norm. You have to handle international kidnapping the same way you handle local criminal kidnapping with Lindberg Laws and maximum force (including the assumption of rational actors with self-interest in survival).
With b) as a norm, the results would functionally destroy the "international community" making b) a non viable option in the future. The norm would provide most power to the most barbaric country willing to kidnap citizens as hostages and willing to kill those hostages. "Peace in our time" (Chamberland / Hitler agreement) only bought a few months before WW11 started.
With religious belief systems the self-interest in survival may not work, so even the MAD nuclear doctrine may have stability issues when Iran gets the bomb. That is really scary.
I feel like these sorts of conversations would have potentially more honest results if instead of "Palestinians and Jews" the speakers would say "Arabs and Jews". They could still have all their same views, but it would be so much plainer what people really want, and what a small area is too much for them and always will be.
Inspired by the first 10 minutes of the podcast: "If one party lacks important facts that the other party has, I would say their understanding of reality is distorted by lack of facts. All else being equal."
https://open.substack.com/pub/scottgibb/p/we-stand-divided-an-introduction?r=nb3bl&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web