Farmer's opinions point toward anti-cyclical prudential regulation or rather regulation that incorporates systemic risk that individual market players lake the incentive to fully incorporate.
Re: "But as maps for policy makers, agent-based models are still far from reliable. I would be careful not to presume that they make centralized decision-making a good way to operate an economy." — Arnold Kling, review at embedded link.
Will the next step be computer simulations of agent-based public-choice models of political behaviors by "a demographically accurate synthetic population" (Farmer) of politicians, regulators, and civil servants?
Arnold's review touches on Farmer's model of "the feasibility of an 'energy transition' to forestall climate change." (Arnold)
Farmer writes:
"In 2050, for example, our estimated global annual expenditure on the electricity network for the Fast Transition is about $670 billion per year, compared with $530 billion per year for the No Transition. However, the expected total system cost in 2050 is about $5.9 trillion for the Fast Transition and $6.3 trillion per year for the No Transition. Thus, although the additional $140 billion of grid costs might seem expensive, it is significantly less than the savings that come from cheaper energy." p. 253 (quoted by Arnold in review)
It seems that switching to the Fast Transition is like assuming a can opener.
Is Farmer's economics *post complexity theory* (an advance on representative-individual economics) but *pre public choice theory* (a step backwards from the economics of politics of Black, Buchanan, Tullock)?
Speed of transition is a function of the rate of the tax on net CO2 emissions. Granted this does assume politicians clever enough to operate a can opener.
Farmer's opinions point toward anti-cyclical prudential regulation or rather regulation that incorporates systemic risk that individual market players lake the incentive to fully incorporate.
Re: "But as maps for policy makers, agent-based models are still far from reliable. I would be careful not to presume that they make centralized decision-making a good way to operate an economy." — Arnold Kling, review at embedded link.
Will the next step be computer simulations of agent-based public-choice models of political behaviors by "a demographically accurate synthetic population" (Farmer) of politicians, regulators, and civil servants?
Arnold's review touches on Farmer's model of "the feasibility of an 'energy transition' to forestall climate change." (Arnold)
Farmer writes:
"In 2050, for example, our estimated global annual expenditure on the electricity network for the Fast Transition is about $670 billion per year, compared with $530 billion per year for the No Transition. However, the expected total system cost in 2050 is about $5.9 trillion for the Fast Transition and $6.3 trillion per year for the No Transition. Thus, although the additional $140 billion of grid costs might seem expensive, it is significantly less than the savings that come from cheaper energy." p. 253 (quoted by Arnold in review)
It seems that switching to the Fast Transition is like assuming a can opener.
Is Farmer's economics *post complexity theory* (an advance on representative-individual economics) but *pre public choice theory* (a step backwards from the economics of politics of Black, Buchanan, Tullock)?
I look forward to Arnold's interview of Farmer.
Speed of transition is a function of the rate of the tax on net CO2 emissions. Granted this does assume politicians clever enough to operate a can opener.