Re: "there may be a strategic justification for sending arms. That is, although prolonging the war will not save Ukraine, it is serving to reduce Mr. Putin’s ability to pursue further military adventures."
The frontal cortex would ask also whether sending arms substantially increases risk of escalation to a direct war between NATO and Russia.
'Red lines' are shifting under pressure. Today, WSJ reports: "Russian Missiles Strike Ukrainian Military Training Base Near Polish Border
Attack on site where U.S. trained local forces kills at least 35, follows Moscow warning that arms shipments to Kyiv won’t be tolerated.":
I'm not very taken by the metaphor. Seems to me that labeling one view the "frontal cortex" and another the "amygdala" is effectively another way of labeling them "smart" and "stupid". That assumes the wisdom of de-escalation, which is not so obvious to me, even after a little deliberation.
Another framing is that de-escalation at all costs is short run thinking, while tit for tat escalation is long run thinking. That framing has the opposite effect. Or one could stick with the amygdala metaphor and assert de-escalation represents fear without a coherent plan to deter Putin next time.
Re: Syria. I wonder if the West did not hit the "bitter spot," enough intervention to prolong the war but not enough early on (should Syria have had a flyable air force with which to bomb the rubbles?)
I called social media a window into the collective id here a while back, but perhaps Freud is too out of fashion these days for that to stick. Amygdala works, too.
I am not aware enough of Syria and Ukraine to know if this comparison is valid, according to the social media posts (incl video where they talk about going to Ukraine) ex-military from all over the world seems to be joining the Ukraine fight, UK, Swiss, Indian, Mexican, US, Ex-Marines, etc. Ukraine essentially has unlimited arms, a larger army than only Ukraine could provide, and its men *and* women fighting. Those differences may be marginal but it may be enough. We might know by the end of the month which direction this is going to go as the arms and extra soldiers begin to have a noticeable effect.
Sending some stinger missiles and implementing some sanctions seems within the allowed rules of war. I can’t really comment on swift. Private companies boycotting is new to war but not new to cancel culture.
Russia may not win. That’s still a maybe. Progress seems to have slowed.
However, I agree that a true insurgency wouldn’t do ukraine much good.
The question with sanctions, public and private, is whether they can be expected to end and on what terms. If they will go on until Putin is overthrown that doesn’t necessarily help ukraine. Negotiated settlement is still their best bet.
I wonder to the extent some sanctions are permanent regardless of intent. Will people trust western banks?
Re: "there may be a strategic justification for sending arms. That is, although prolonging the war will not save Ukraine, it is serving to reduce Mr. Putin’s ability to pursue further military adventures."
The frontal cortex would ask also whether sending arms substantially increases risk of escalation to a direct war between NATO and Russia.
'Red lines' are shifting under pressure. Today, WSJ reports: "Russian Missiles Strike Ukrainian Military Training Base Near Polish Border
Attack on site where U.S. trained local forces kills at least 35, follows Moscow warning that arms shipments to Kyiv won’t be tolerated.":
https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-missiles-strike-ukrainian-military-training-base-near-polish-border-11647169428
Deterrence or escalation? Decision-making under uncertainty.
I'm not very taken by the metaphor. Seems to me that labeling one view the "frontal cortex" and another the "amygdala" is effectively another way of labeling them "smart" and "stupid". That assumes the wisdom of de-escalation, which is not so obvious to me, even after a little deliberation.
Another framing is that de-escalation at all costs is short run thinking, while tit for tat escalation is long run thinking. That framing has the opposite effect. Or one could stick with the amygdala metaphor and assert de-escalation represents fear without a coherent plan to deter Putin next time.
Re: Syria. I wonder if the West did not hit the "bitter spot," enough intervention to prolong the war but not enough early on (should Syria have had a flyable air force with which to bomb the rubbles?)
I called social media a window into the collective id here a while back, but perhaps Freud is too out of fashion these days for that to stick. Amygdala works, too.
I am not aware enough of Syria and Ukraine to know if this comparison is valid, according to the social media posts (incl video where they talk about going to Ukraine) ex-military from all over the world seems to be joining the Ukraine fight, UK, Swiss, Indian, Mexican, US, Ex-Marines, etc. Ukraine essentially has unlimited arms, a larger army than only Ukraine could provide, and its men *and* women fighting. Those differences may be marginal but it may be enough. We might know by the end of the month which direction this is going to go as the arms and extra soldiers begin to have a noticeable effect.
Sending some stinger missiles and implementing some sanctions seems within the allowed rules of war. I can’t really comment on swift. Private companies boycotting is new to war but not new to cancel culture.
Russia may not win. That’s still a maybe. Progress seems to have slowed.
However, I agree that a true insurgency wouldn’t do ukraine much good.
The question with sanctions, public and private, is whether they can be expected to end and on what terms. If they will go on until Putin is overthrown that doesn’t necessarily help ukraine. Negotiated settlement is still their best bet.
I wonder to the extent some sanctions are permanent regardless of intent. Will people trust western banks?
I wonder to what extent Zelensky’s media background helped with the meme war.