Bryan Caplan on philanthropy; Michael Lind on vicarious patriotism; Ezra Klein and Masha Gessen; Ed West on the liberal order; Matt Taibbi and Chris Hedges on the liberal order
Well isn’t the failure of enforced multi-ethnicity the lesson of the Tower of Babel? Multi-ethnic is by definition the World at large; the diversity of cultural, language, customs, religion, politics - elements that make a distinct, cohesive, stable society - is what has always caused tensions, conflict, wars and is what makes recognised borders and Nation so important so each feels distinct and secure in its territory.
Creating ‘multi-ethnicity’within a Country is like trying to create the World in miniature, and will lead to internal conflicts and the inevitable construction of internal borders, not physical, but identity borders, identity enclaves, struggling for supremacy. As we now see.
We don't need to create multi-ethnicity, just take maximum advantage of what we've got and could have if we were more welcoming of skilled and talented immigrants.
I don't know how the Ukraine war will end. The ultimate terms will change based on reality in the field and I'm unable to forecast whether that will improve or degrade relative to today for the combatants, or even offer an accurate take of the relative strength of the forces today. Different sources tell me different things and I don't trust any of them.
My completely uniformed opening war prediction was that Russia could probably conquer east of the Dnieper eventually if it wanted to, but might have a lot of trouble getting any further (especially holding it). This is based on no knowledge of military matters, I just looked at a map. I think the biggest risk to Ukraine is if the Donbass army gets surrounded, but if they retreat they are giving up on eastern Ukraine. It seems like the combatants have realized this is the decisive theatre of the war at this point.
Baring a catastrophe, whether Russia does well and grabs more land in the peace deal, or Ukraine does well and grabs more land in the peace deal, probably isn't going to change whether Ukraine or Russia continue to exist at this point. Again, I can't say how likely a catastrophe is on either side.
The more difficult question is what are the war aims of "the west". Specifically, what are the war aims of the neoliberal establishment, as I think the war aims of average western people are "do about what we are doing and whatever happens, happens".
In the first week or so the war aim was to turn Ukraine into Afghanistan 2.0, with a new Mujahideen slowly bleeding Russia dry over a decade. Since Kiev didn't fall the war aim now seems to be:
1) Russia must suffer a humiliating, undeniable, and total defeat. To be seen to do so by all including themselves. Going on Fukuyama this would mean the entire Russian field army being driven out of Ukraine without outside assistance (beyond what we give now), including Donbass and Crimea.
2) This should discredit Putin and hopefully lead to his overthrow.
3) This will convince Xi to submit to western authority forever.
4) Inflation will go back to 2%, parents will decree Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion are why Ukraine won, all populism will be permanently discredited and Trump will have a heart attack and die, the Biden's and Romney's of the US and Europe will sweep elections.
And of course is Ukraine loses (achieves anything less than above) than the complete opposite of all those things will happen.
That may all seem like a bit much, but it really is what these people seem to be writing and feeling.
I read a tweet by a French diplomat/military guy basically saying that for certain people in the west Ukraine is the "Golden Snitch". Which is something from Harry Potter that is worth a million bazillion points and you automatically win if you get it no matter what the score from the entire rest of the game was. That seems about right for Marvel Cinematic Universe neoliberals.
I'm very skeptical about all that. Now Ukraine achieving maximal military success, whatever its relative odds, is at least a real world possibility. The rest of it though...Biden can't even get a war bump in the polls.
Simply put, I don't see how too poor kleptocratic slav countries mobilizing tiny fractions of their populations and shooting at each other would prove anything about anything based on who had controlled more shelled out dirt at the end up the slugging match.
Ultimately, we should want what's best for everyone involved. In Ukraine, Russia, and the rest of the world. That's going to take a lot of messy sausage making, and the best outcome for those directly involved probably isn't going solve any of the domestic problems with neoliberalism and that shouldn't be driving the train here.
I'm "pro Ukraine" as far as that goes. I don't think their cause deserves maximalist zeal, it isn't worth a nuclear war but its probably worth what we are doing currently. I think the best outcome for Ukraine is to end the war and survive, once that has been secured I think the remaining details are small and revisable. But being pro Ukraine means dealing with the actual Ukraine and the actual Russia and achieving an actual outcome on the ground. Not grandstanding or using these people are pawns in a proxy war between "the west" and "whatever perceived forces a certain faction in the west doesn't like."
I'm not sure what the relevance of (4) etc. is and I'm confused by your use of the term neoliberalism (free markets seem pretty orthogonal to the war?) but my guess is 1) total Ukrainian 'maximalist' success is impossible because 2) is also impossible. The majority Russians have rallied behind Putin, his favorability ratings are actually up; I'd put the odds of a coup in the next year pretty close to 0. That also means Putin can throw a lot more - maybe hundreds of thousands of troops more - at Ukraine without seriously risking being overthrown, and I think he'd probably do that if the only alternative were total defeat (which would do much more to increase the risk of a coup). Note that Russia just conscripted >100k new soldiers. And I doubt Ukraine could defeat a few hundred thousand more Russians. Ukraine's best hope is they make it costly enough that Putin sees a deal for the consolation prize of not joining NATO + concessions in Donbas as worth not having to prolong and intensify the war.
I think the more realistic expectation re your #3 (though it doesn't make for as good of a bumper sticker as 'fighting for freedom and democracy' etc.) is that Russia pays a sufficiently severe cost for undermining the postwar peace (which is more important IMO than any particular ideology; not returning to pre-1945 geopolitics should be high on everyone's priorities list), and Xi Jinping is more hesitant to invade Taiwan. Idk if he actually will be, Taiwan is different enough from Ukraine that one could easily argue that the analogy doesn't really work. But at least Xi will now probably seriously wonder if his generals have all lied to him about how easy it would be.
Maybe neoliberal not the best term, but it's how a lot of people in this group describe themselves.
Yeah, everyone can play the conscript more people game. That's one reason peace is best.
I honestly don't know what is going to happen militarily.
We will never know if this deterred Xi militarily. If he invades it didn't, but maybe he was always going to do it anyway. If he doesn't invade we will never know that this is the reason or not. It may even be that he invades because of what he's seeing.
"Ordinary people in this country are proudly loyal to America and don’t give a @#%&% about Ukraine. For the progressive elites, it’s the other way around."
I submit that this is a non-example of taking the most charitable view of those who disagree.
"Ordinary people in this country are proudly loyal to America and don’t give a @#%&% about Ukraine. For the progressive elites, it’s the other way around."
I submit that this is a non-example of taking the most charitable view of those who disagree.
Since “effective altruism is socially inferior to investing for a profit,” so-called “effective altruism” needs to be renamed: it is really an attempt to distinguish, among *non-profit, ostensibly altruistic enterprises*, those that are more effective than the others. These will usually not be *effective* in absolute terms, since for-profit enterprises do more net good.
Lind's "return of the repressed" "vicarious Ukrainian nationalism" may go some way to explaining the situation described in the first of today's Editor's Picks from Foreign Policy:
"Stark divide. The United States wants to establish a unified diplomatic front in support of Ukraine. But most of the world is not interested in isolating Russia, FP’s Colum Lynch reports."
This seems like a weak week for the FITs. Mostly just grumbling about things that are already going to be popular and well understood within their own audience.
I think it's rather that multi-ethnic empires require something other than national identity to bind them together, which historically often meant personal loyalty to an emperor as the substitute, but they could also find cohesion around common civic life/citizenship and institutions (e.g., Rome during the late republic). Historically, I'm not convinced emperors of diverse empires were more tyrannical than rulers of nation-states. The Sassanids, the Habsburgs, and the Mughals were probably better than their more ethnically homogeneous counterparts. The British Empire is another great example of a comparatively tolerant, fair, multi-ethnic empire. I think West (who I see as being on the opposite side of the issue from Harzony) was suggesting that the opponents to such multi-ethnic empires often tended to be chauvinistic, intolerant nationalists rather than diverse, open-minded cosmopolitans as portrayed in the movies.
As someone who considers himself both an ordinary American and a Progressive (or at least neo-liberal) elite I think both claims of
"Ordinary people in this country are proudly loyal to America and don’t give a @#%&% about Ukraine. For the progressive elites, it’s the other way around."
I don't know. I hear from conservatives that liberals or progressives are not patriotic, but it's not my personal experience. And I live in WDC and know plenty of people who could be viewed by conservatives a "elites" and they don't strike me as any les patriotic than other people. It's true that conservatives have kind of given really overt symbolic displays of patriotic symbols a bad taste (lots of American flags at the Jan 6 insurrection), but they go down to the Mall on the Fourth like everybody else.
I'm old enough to remember when Christopher Hedges was a darling on the left. I guess now that the last of the traditionally conservative portions of the federal government have been taken over, they don't have any use for him anymore. Friends like these, huh Gary?
I have a feeling we've reached "peak Zelensky" in the West, even among elites.
On a Zoom call recently, I saw someone who is a paradigmatic elite dressed in a Zelensky outfit–––olive green t-shirt and folded arms, contrary to their usual outfit. If that's not peak, I don't know what is.
I may be naïve to think this but you can have all three with the proper definition of *order*, such as a defined, orderly, and transparent process by which you allow the citizens of a multi-ethnic empire the freedom to express themselves and adjudicate their differences. You get neither order nor individual freedom if you define it as being uniform results, either economic or political. And you'll eventually not have 'multi-ethnic', too.
US is at or near top in multi-ethnic "empires" and individual liberty in history. And . . . It's hardly a bastion of chaos or anarchy. Rule of law remains strong here
You must mean those ‘mostly peaceful’ riots, house arrest of healthy people, coercion to take a drug, child abuse in schools, lawless areas of no effective policing, FBI investigation of parents concerned about their child ten’s education… well a long list.
The key question being 'compared to what?' For most of your list, the ethnically homogeneous developed countries are way worse. In much of Europe you can be incarcerated for mean tweets, homeschooling is literally illegal, and mandates of all kinds are much more stringently enforced.
Everything I said is consistent with there being significant problems, if not the right wing fantasy versions of them or characteristic lack of historical perspective
Well isn’t the failure of enforced multi-ethnicity the lesson of the Tower of Babel? Multi-ethnic is by definition the World at large; the diversity of cultural, language, customs, religion, politics - elements that make a distinct, cohesive, stable society - is what has always caused tensions, conflict, wars and is what makes recognised borders and Nation so important so each feels distinct and secure in its territory.
Creating ‘multi-ethnicity’within a Country is like trying to create the World in miniature, and will lead to internal conflicts and the inevitable construction of internal borders, not physical, but identity borders, identity enclaves, struggling for supremacy. As we now see.
We don't need to create multi-ethnicity, just take maximum advantage of what we've got and could have if we were more welcoming of skilled and talented immigrants.
I don't know how the Ukraine war will end. The ultimate terms will change based on reality in the field and I'm unable to forecast whether that will improve or degrade relative to today for the combatants, or even offer an accurate take of the relative strength of the forces today. Different sources tell me different things and I don't trust any of them.
My completely uniformed opening war prediction was that Russia could probably conquer east of the Dnieper eventually if it wanted to, but might have a lot of trouble getting any further (especially holding it). This is based on no knowledge of military matters, I just looked at a map. I think the biggest risk to Ukraine is if the Donbass army gets surrounded, but if they retreat they are giving up on eastern Ukraine. It seems like the combatants have realized this is the decisive theatre of the war at this point.
Baring a catastrophe, whether Russia does well and grabs more land in the peace deal, or Ukraine does well and grabs more land in the peace deal, probably isn't going to change whether Ukraine or Russia continue to exist at this point. Again, I can't say how likely a catastrophe is on either side.
The more difficult question is what are the war aims of "the west". Specifically, what are the war aims of the neoliberal establishment, as I think the war aims of average western people are "do about what we are doing and whatever happens, happens".
In the first week or so the war aim was to turn Ukraine into Afghanistan 2.0, with a new Mujahideen slowly bleeding Russia dry over a decade. Since Kiev didn't fall the war aim now seems to be:
1) Russia must suffer a humiliating, undeniable, and total defeat. To be seen to do so by all including themselves. Going on Fukuyama this would mean the entire Russian field army being driven out of Ukraine without outside assistance (beyond what we give now), including Donbass and Crimea.
2) This should discredit Putin and hopefully lead to his overthrow.
3) This will convince Xi to submit to western authority forever.
4) Inflation will go back to 2%, parents will decree Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion are why Ukraine won, all populism will be permanently discredited and Trump will have a heart attack and die, the Biden's and Romney's of the US and Europe will sweep elections.
And of course is Ukraine loses (achieves anything less than above) than the complete opposite of all those things will happen.
That may all seem like a bit much, but it really is what these people seem to be writing and feeling.
I read a tweet by a French diplomat/military guy basically saying that for certain people in the west Ukraine is the "Golden Snitch". Which is something from Harry Potter that is worth a million bazillion points and you automatically win if you get it no matter what the score from the entire rest of the game was. That seems about right for Marvel Cinematic Universe neoliberals.
I'm very skeptical about all that. Now Ukraine achieving maximal military success, whatever its relative odds, is at least a real world possibility. The rest of it though...Biden can't even get a war bump in the polls.
Simply put, I don't see how too poor kleptocratic slav countries mobilizing tiny fractions of their populations and shooting at each other would prove anything about anything based on who had controlled more shelled out dirt at the end up the slugging match.
Ultimately, we should want what's best for everyone involved. In Ukraine, Russia, and the rest of the world. That's going to take a lot of messy sausage making, and the best outcome for those directly involved probably isn't going solve any of the domestic problems with neoliberalism and that shouldn't be driving the train here.
I'm "pro Ukraine" as far as that goes. I don't think their cause deserves maximalist zeal, it isn't worth a nuclear war but its probably worth what we are doing currently. I think the best outcome for Ukraine is to end the war and survive, once that has been secured I think the remaining details are small and revisable. But being pro Ukraine means dealing with the actual Ukraine and the actual Russia and achieving an actual outcome on the ground. Not grandstanding or using these people are pawns in a proxy war between "the west" and "whatever perceived forces a certain faction in the west doesn't like."
I'm not sure what the relevance of (4) etc. is and I'm confused by your use of the term neoliberalism (free markets seem pretty orthogonal to the war?) but my guess is 1) total Ukrainian 'maximalist' success is impossible because 2) is also impossible. The majority Russians have rallied behind Putin, his favorability ratings are actually up; I'd put the odds of a coup in the next year pretty close to 0. That also means Putin can throw a lot more - maybe hundreds of thousands of troops more - at Ukraine without seriously risking being overthrown, and I think he'd probably do that if the only alternative were total defeat (which would do much more to increase the risk of a coup). Note that Russia just conscripted >100k new soldiers. And I doubt Ukraine could defeat a few hundred thousand more Russians. Ukraine's best hope is they make it costly enough that Putin sees a deal for the consolation prize of not joining NATO + concessions in Donbas as worth not having to prolong and intensify the war.
I think the more realistic expectation re your #3 (though it doesn't make for as good of a bumper sticker as 'fighting for freedom and democracy' etc.) is that Russia pays a sufficiently severe cost for undermining the postwar peace (which is more important IMO than any particular ideology; not returning to pre-1945 geopolitics should be high on everyone's priorities list), and Xi Jinping is more hesitant to invade Taiwan. Idk if he actually will be, Taiwan is different enough from Ukraine that one could easily argue that the analogy doesn't really work. But at least Xi will now probably seriously wonder if his generals have all lied to him about how easy it would be.
Maybe neoliberal not the best term, but it's how a lot of people in this group describe themselves.
Yeah, everyone can play the conscript more people game. That's one reason peace is best.
I honestly don't know what is going to happen militarily.
We will never know if this deterred Xi militarily. If he invades it didn't, but maybe he was always going to do it anyway. If he doesn't invade we will never know that this is the reason or not. It may even be that he invades because of what he's seeing.
"Ordinary people in this country are proudly loyal to America and don’t give a @#%&% about Ukraine. For the progressive elites, it’s the other way around."
I submit that this is a non-example of taking the most charitable view of those who disagree.
"Ordinary people in this country are proudly loyal to America and don’t give a @#%&% about Ukraine. For the progressive elites, it’s the other way around."
I submit that this is a non-example of taking the most charitable view of those who disagree.
Since “effective altruism is socially inferior to investing for a profit,” so-called “effective altruism” needs to be renamed: it is really an attempt to distinguish, among *non-profit, ostensibly altruistic enterprises*, those that are more effective than the others. These will usually not be *effective* in absolute terms, since for-profit enterprises do more net good.
You can have all three if the “order” is supplied from the inside, as in religion. Having rejected religion, the options are more limited.
Lind's "return of the repressed" "vicarious Ukrainian nationalism" may go some way to explaining the situation described in the first of today's Editor's Picks from Foreign Policy:
"Stark divide. The United States wants to establish a unified diplomatic front in support of Ukraine. But most of the world is not interested in isolating Russia, FP’s Colum Lynch reports."
They have their own (non-repressed) nationalisms.
This seems like a weak week for the FITs. Mostly just grumbling about things that are already going to be popular and well understood within their own audience.
A lot of commentary these days seems to suggest: order, multi-ethnic empire, individual freedom—choose two.
I'll take multi-ethnic empire and individua freedom and just live with having to stay on the line for English.
It seems to me as though the trend is toward neither order or individual freedom. I guess one out of three isn't so bad, though.
I think it's rather that multi-ethnic empires require something other than national identity to bind them together, which historically often meant personal loyalty to an emperor as the substitute, but they could also find cohesion around common civic life/citizenship and institutions (e.g., Rome during the late republic). Historically, I'm not convinced emperors of diverse empires were more tyrannical than rulers of nation-states. The Sassanids, the Habsburgs, and the Mughals were probably better than their more ethnically homogeneous counterparts. The British Empire is another great example of a comparatively tolerant, fair, multi-ethnic empire. I think West (who I see as being on the opposite side of the issue from Harzony) was suggesting that the opponents to such multi-ethnic empires often tended to be chauvinistic, intolerant nationalists rather than diverse, open-minded cosmopolitans as portrayed in the movies.
As someone who considers himself both an ordinary American and a Progressive (or at least neo-liberal) elite I think both claims of
"Ordinary people in this country are proudly loyal to America and don’t give a @#%&% about Ukraine. For the progressive elites, it’s the other way around."
are false.
I'm sure most ordinary folk are proudly loyal to America, but most elites are mostly just critical of the non-Dem dominated parts of America.
While lots of both care, some, about Ukraine - tho less than about local inflation or gas prices or jobs.
I don't know. I hear from conservatives that liberals or progressives are not patriotic, but it's not my personal experience. And I live in WDC and know plenty of people who could be viewed by conservatives a "elites" and they don't strike me as any les patriotic than other people. It's true that conservatives have kind of given really overt symbolic displays of patriotic symbols a bad taste (lots of American flags at the Jan 6 insurrection), but they go down to the Mall on the Fourth like everybody else.
I'm old enough to remember when Christopher Hedges was a darling on the left. I guess now that the last of the traditionally conservative portions of the federal government have been taken over, they don't have any use for him anymore. Friends like these, huh Gary?
I have a feeling we've reached "peak Zelensky" in the West, even among elites.
On a Zoom call recently, I saw someone who is a paradigmatic elite dressed in a Zelensky outfit–––olive green t-shirt and folded arms, contrary to their usual outfit. If that's not peak, I don't know what is.
Wasn’t that Emperor Macron?
Switzerland: multi-"ethnic", maximal freedom - never had even a king. It's baffling that you take Hazony's tribalism seriously.
I may be naïve to think this but you can have all three with the proper definition of *order*, such as a defined, orderly, and transparent process by which you allow the citizens of a multi-ethnic empire the freedom to express themselves and adjudicate their differences. You get neither order nor individual freedom if you define it as being uniform results, either economic or political. And you'll eventually not have 'multi-ethnic', too.
US is at or near top in multi-ethnic "empires" and individual liberty in history. And . . . It's hardly a bastion of chaos or anarchy. Rule of law remains strong here
You must mean those ‘mostly peaceful’ riots, house arrest of healthy people, coercion to take a drug, child abuse in schools, lawless areas of no effective policing, FBI investigation of parents concerned about their child ten’s education… well a long list.
The key question being 'compared to what?' For most of your list, the ethnically homogeneous developed countries are way worse. In much of Europe you can be incarcerated for mean tweets, homeschooling is literally illegal, and mandates of all kinds are much more stringently enforced.
Everything I said is consistent with there being significant problems, if not the right wing fantasy versions of them or characteristic lack of historical perspective
But what you said is not consistent with the reality.