Noah Smith and Andrew Gelman; Scott Alexander on rationality; Robert Wright on Ukraine; Jonathan Turley on non-government censorship; Stephen Kotkin on Ukraine
Your definition of rationality is not an effective one. When people discuss whether Putin is making decisions rationally or not, they mean 'does he have a stable cost-benefit analysis?' This includes all sorts of values and expectations, including the desire to experience pleasure (like riding a bike) or avoid pain (even being deprived of a tantalizing steak dinner). When these same people say he is being 'irrational' and then tie it to mental health, they are asserting that decision making is being conducted in an unstable and internally inconsistent fashion.
What you mean is something else - about the incorporation of public and private (personal/local) information, integration of private and local preferences, and values into collective decision making. This is akin to the primacy of supposed secularism - the only sound basis for communal argumentation is (in this model) to be communal, verifiable, falsifiable truth.
One major failure in the defense of rational public decision making is the notion that this can be applied universally and scale independently. You acknowledge that an individual can make individual decisions on the basis of personal preferences which cannot be put on a public footing. The same is true of groups at any scale. They can make decisions rationally and yet use information that isn't verifiable outside their own boundaries.
In fact, much of the poverty of secularism is the notion that universal falsifiable public truth is anywhere near sufficient for daily decision making. It is not, and that inadequacy requires a surreptitious importing of considerations out-of-bounds. This violation is distributed unequally and ultimately represents a major breach of trust because it must be denied, ignored, and covered to maintain the semblance of secularism which violently represses all other claims to legitimate preference.
It is possible to define ‘rationality’ more broadly but, given that you define it as holding *beliefs* on a certain basis, your *preferences* for dancing and bike-riding as hobbies cannot be *rational*, because they are not *beliefs*. (There are some beliefs in the vicinity; for example, presumably you believe that you enjoy dancing. That belief is rational and is a partial basis for choosing to spend some of your free time dancing.) Once you have confined "rationality" to beliefs, you should do the same for "irrationality," in which case your preferences are also not *irrational*.
“Rationality is the attempt to hold beliefs that can be impersonally justified using logic and observation.”
I like it, but I’m not sure about the “impersonal” modifier. It makes sense if we are assuming a purely physicalist universe. But that’s a metaphysical assumption, not a rational calculation. In a broader sense, couldn’t one rationally hold beliefs based on personal religious experience? Or from the other angle, if one has had a religious experience, would it be rational to neglect that observation in deciding what beliefs to hold?
Re: "Rationality is the attempt to hold beliefs that can be impersonally justified using logic and observation. My beliefs about inflation, whether right or wrong, are rational. My choices of dancing and bike-riding as hobbies are not rational, in the sense that you probably could not talk me out of them using logic and observation."
Hume: "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions." File hobbies under passions.
Rationality is doing one's level best, in the circumstances, to try and know what there is reason to think one needs to know in order to achieve one's goals.
Rational beliefs and rational choice differ in 'direction of fit' between mental states and the world. Rational beliefs would mirror the world. Rational choice of means would bend the world to one's desire.
Rationality has 3 components:
1. Belief-formation about the world outside one's mind. Arnold aptly describes this component: "the attempt to hold beliefs that can be impersonally justified using logic and observation." Knowledge of relevant facts and mechanisms is crucial. Note: The world includes other minds -- Accurate discernment of others' beliefs, motivations, and (ir)rationality might be crucial. For example, there would be great pragmatic value in knowing Vladimir Putin's beliefs and desires.
2. Introspection about one's motivations (passions, preferences, desires, internalized norms). I would describe this as the attempt to be clear-eyed about one's motivations. What are my motivations? Are they consistent? Which among them is stronger? What is my time horizon? Am I risk averse?
3. Choice of means -- a course of action, or perhaps inaction -- best suited to achieve one's motivation(s).
I agree with Kotkin's strong belief that neither Russia nor China will converge to anything close to American-style democracy. I'd add many other countries to that list, including Chile where I live (this Friday, Chile will have a new president, a 36-year old illusionist who has promised to deliver whatever the ongoing Constitutional Assembly approves later this year).
Indeed, the prospect of Russia and China not being an American-style democracy implies the prospect of big conflict. The ongoing U.S. conflict with Russia over Ukraine can easily be extend to a conflict with China over Taiwan (I agree with Goldman's understanding of these two conflicts in https://pjmedia.com/spengler/2022/03/08/reliving-the-nightmare-of-1914-were-doing-it-againi-n1564934 ). Long ago, the late Herschel Grossman used to talk about never-ending big conflicts, the ones that could be solved only through war. Most likely, however, the "final" war will be delayed until one of the parties is close to total certainty about winning it. And in the meantime "proxy" wars will continue to remind us about how big the conflict is. Putin's invasion is a reminder.
I agree with your definition of rationality. I think your beliefs about inflation are rationally wrong. Although I think the best way to understand inflation is to study both the financing of government expenditure in Argentina since 1946 and the containment of inflation by direct government intervention when the same government relied on the inflation tax to finance its deficit, I cannot refer you and your readers to good studies of the Argentina's experience. I know it well because I lived it during 1946-72 and since then I have followed it every day because I have been taking personal decisions and giving professional advice based on my beliefs.
For an example of what I'm talking, look at what is going on there today: the government has negotiated a new fiscal adjustment agreement with the IMF but it has a hard time to get Congress approval (many members think is too much adjustment, a few too little). Maybe today (3/9/22) Congress will decide about it. If it's approved, inflation may go down from 50% per year to less than 30% by early 2023 but only if it survives the first 6 months in which inflation will accelerate to well over 50% in the previous 12 months. BTW, the market exchange rate is over 200 pesos per US dollar and the official rate just over 100 pesos (but farmers are getting around 75 pesos for their export earnings).
Arnold;
Your definition of rationality is not an effective one. When people discuss whether Putin is making decisions rationally or not, they mean 'does he have a stable cost-benefit analysis?' This includes all sorts of values and expectations, including the desire to experience pleasure (like riding a bike) or avoid pain (even being deprived of a tantalizing steak dinner). When these same people say he is being 'irrational' and then tie it to mental health, they are asserting that decision making is being conducted in an unstable and internally inconsistent fashion.
What you mean is something else - about the incorporation of public and private (personal/local) information, integration of private and local preferences, and values into collective decision making. This is akin to the primacy of supposed secularism - the only sound basis for communal argumentation is (in this model) to be communal, verifiable, falsifiable truth.
One major failure in the defense of rational public decision making is the notion that this can be applied universally and scale independently. You acknowledge that an individual can make individual decisions on the basis of personal preferences which cannot be put on a public footing. The same is true of groups at any scale. They can make decisions rationally and yet use information that isn't verifiable outside their own boundaries.
In fact, much of the poverty of secularism is the notion that universal falsifiable public truth is anywhere near sufficient for daily decision making. It is not, and that inadequacy requires a surreptitious importing of considerations out-of-bounds. This violation is distributed unequally and ultimately represents a major breach of trust because it must be denied, ignored, and covered to maintain the semblance of secularism which violently represses all other claims to legitimate preference.
It is possible to define ‘rationality’ more broadly but, given that you define it as holding *beliefs* on a certain basis, your *preferences* for dancing and bike-riding as hobbies cannot be *rational*, because they are not *beliefs*. (There are some beliefs in the vicinity; for example, presumably you believe that you enjoy dancing. That belief is rational and is a partial basis for choosing to spend some of your free time dancing.) Once you have confined "rationality" to beliefs, you should do the same for "irrationality," in which case your preferences are also not *irrational*.
Rationality in 3 maxims:
Get the facts straight. Know thyself. Then make the smart choice.
Prudence in 2 maxims:
Don't underestimate your opponent's rationality. Don't overestimate your opponent's rationality.
“Rationality is the attempt to hold beliefs that can be impersonally justified using logic and observation.”
I like it, but I’m not sure about the “impersonal” modifier. It makes sense if we are assuming a purely physicalist universe. But that’s a metaphysical assumption, not a rational calculation. In a broader sense, couldn’t one rationally hold beliefs based on personal religious experience? Or from the other angle, if one has had a religious experience, would it be rational to neglect that observation in deciding what beliefs to hold?
Re: "Rationality is the attempt to hold beliefs that can be impersonally justified using logic and observation. My beliefs about inflation, whether right or wrong, are rational. My choices of dancing and bike-riding as hobbies are not rational, in the sense that you probably could not talk me out of them using logic and observation."
Hume: "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions." File hobbies under passions.
Rationality is doing one's level best, in the circumstances, to try and know what there is reason to think one needs to know in order to achieve one's goals.
Rational beliefs and rational choice differ in 'direction of fit' between mental states and the world. Rational beliefs would mirror the world. Rational choice of means would bend the world to one's desire.
Rationality has 3 components:
1. Belief-formation about the world outside one's mind. Arnold aptly describes this component: "the attempt to hold beliefs that can be impersonally justified using logic and observation." Knowledge of relevant facts and mechanisms is crucial. Note: The world includes other minds -- Accurate discernment of others' beliefs, motivations, and (ir)rationality might be crucial. For example, there would be great pragmatic value in knowing Vladimir Putin's beliefs and desires.
2. Introspection about one's motivations (passions, preferences, desires, internalized norms). I would describe this as the attempt to be clear-eyed about one's motivations. What are my motivations? Are they consistent? Which among them is stronger? What is my time horizon? Am I risk averse?
3. Choice of means -- a course of action, or perhaps inaction -- best suited to achieve one's motivation(s).
I agree with Kotkin's strong belief that neither Russia nor China will converge to anything close to American-style democracy. I'd add many other countries to that list, including Chile where I live (this Friday, Chile will have a new president, a 36-year old illusionist who has promised to deliver whatever the ongoing Constitutional Assembly approves later this year).
Indeed, the prospect of Russia and China not being an American-style democracy implies the prospect of big conflict. The ongoing U.S. conflict with Russia over Ukraine can easily be extend to a conflict with China over Taiwan (I agree with Goldman's understanding of these two conflicts in https://pjmedia.com/spengler/2022/03/08/reliving-the-nightmare-of-1914-were-doing-it-againi-n1564934 ). Long ago, the late Herschel Grossman used to talk about never-ending big conflicts, the ones that could be solved only through war. Most likely, however, the "final" war will be delayed until one of the parties is close to total certainty about winning it. And in the meantime "proxy" wars will continue to remind us about how big the conflict is. Putin's invasion is a reminder.
I agree with your definition of rationality. I think your beliefs about inflation are rationally wrong. Although I think the best way to understand inflation is to study both the financing of government expenditure in Argentina since 1946 and the containment of inflation by direct government intervention when the same government relied on the inflation tax to finance its deficit, I cannot refer you and your readers to good studies of the Argentina's experience. I know it well because I lived it during 1946-72 and since then I have followed it every day because I have been taking personal decisions and giving professional advice based on my beliefs.
For an example of what I'm talking, look at what is going on there today: the government has negotiated a new fiscal adjustment agreement with the IMF but it has a hard time to get Congress approval (many members think is too much adjustment, a few too little). Maybe today (3/9/22) Congress will decide about it. If it's approved, inflation may go down from 50% per year to less than 30% by early 2023 but only if it survives the first 6 months in which inflation will accelerate to well over 50% in the previous 12 months. BTW, the market exchange rate is over 200 pesos per US dollar and the official rate just over 100 pesos (but farmers are getting around 75 pesos for their export earnings).