"I don’t believe that China and other countries would have reacted to an easy Russian victory in Ukraine by lowering their support for Russia. More likely such a victory would have inclined them to draw closer to Russia."
I believe his argument is that we should have accepted the Russian demands that were made before the war (no NATO, etc). One could probably even throw in the Russian peace offer a month in (status quo ante-bellum).
If having accepted those terms, Russia invaded anyway, then the moral view would be much clearer.
As far as I can tell the net result of rejecting these terms is Ukraine will get wrecked and Russia will own at least 20% of the country if not more.
---
In 1938, opinion polls were taking their first baby steps. A British poll taken in the Munich conference’s immediate aftermath had 57% satisfied with Chamberlain, 33% dissatisfied and 10% undecided.
A French opinion poll carried out in early October 1938 had 57% in favor of Daladier’s policy, 37% against and 6% undecided, very similar to Britain’s post-Munich numbers.
---
There really wasn't a lot of public support for starting a war over Munich in the west, unlike in 1939 when it was a lot higher over Poland. Keep in mind to even in 1940 the British and French couldn't even convince the Low Countries to abandon neutrality.
----
"The usual defense of Chamberlain is that Britain needed more time to prepare militarily, and that the Munich agreement bought time. But Germany also was building up its arms, so this is not a very persuasive argument."
From what I can tell the German army got stronger vis a vis the allies but its Air Force got weaker between Munich and 1940. It's hard to say which mattered more, but probably the army stuff helped with the Battle of France and the Air Force stuff hurt in the Battle of Britain. Of course the Battle of France was largely decided by maneuver rather then fighting.
It's also hard to understand the participants without understanding what they believed about Strategic Air Power before the war (the bomber will always get through). Chamberlin was being told by his military people that London would be leveled.
So much of what happened is colored by the German Sickle Cut miracle working in France. It wasn't supposed to, and it makes everything that came before it seem foolhardy in retrospect. If it fails and Germany loses the Battle of France, how is Chamberlin seen.
The best argument against Chamberlin is that maybe the Oster Conspiracy might have removed Hitler, but given actual history he avoided that plenty of other times.
Agreed, my understanding of this POV is that Russia saw the movement towards admitting Ukraine to NATO as the initial aggression. Since admission to NATO binds other countries to come to Ukraine's defense, the argument is that Russia thought it was their last chance to avoid NATO on their doorstep.
I find that to be a convincing line of reasoning. I think the most persuasive counter-argument I've seen is that Russia took Crimea prior to that, which is hard to square with that narrative.
The "NATO on the doorstep" excuse offered by many Westerners for Russian behavior is transparent bullshit. Russia has way more NATO now on its literal doorstep (30 km from its second biggest city and erstwhile imperial capital) than it did before, and what does Russia do? Emit dismissive noises and move troops and weapons from its new Northern border with NATO to Ukraine. It was not and never has been about NATO per se - after all, guess who built Russia's current military industry? - but about not being able to bully and have its way with Ukraine anymore. Fundamentally, most Russian elites (even so-called "liberals") and many of the Russian people have never accepted the independence of Ukraine, and they want to see it liquidated. Putin apparently wants this to be his historical legacy. Russian Z-channels being loudly livid a couple of weeks ago about Ukrainians "celebrating their smelly induhpenice" in public rather than cowering underground in fear of millions of Russian missiles, and these babushkas https://t.me/HUhmuroeutro/33214, are typical of this sentiment. NATO is only a factor insofar as Ukrainian membership in it would put an end to Russian irredentism. If instead of NATO it was military alliance with Mars and Saturn, Russian propaganda would bark at those instead, and Western Putin-verstehers would be deploring offensive planetary astronomy.
I think you stated it perfectly in your first part. I found what AK wrote less clear so maybe I misunderstood but it seemed he said something different.
The rest is interesting. I agree it is important that the public wasn't keen on more aggressive action. Surely not the same but Roosevelt also faced quite a bit of public resistance when the US entered.
Roman’s logic doesn’t make much sense to me. In Chamberlain’s case, he didn’t have the support in Parliament to go to war. You can blame that on him for not preparing the populace for that outcome and I’d tend to agree but there was massive resistance to another war. It’s not clear any politician could have done it. I see nothing similar in the Ukraine example. First the US has no real interests in Ukraine and Russia isn’t a threat to us or most of Europe. It’s an aging petro state with a declining population. Germany alone has something like 3-4x its GDP and the EU has many times its population. Russia in 2024 is not Germany in 1938-9. Germany was a reemerging industrial and demographic power with the ability to dominate the largest economic block in the world: Europe. Today only China comes close and so the US should focus there not on a broken down Russia that can’t even take the whole Donbas much less Warsaw, Berlin, or Paris. I also don’t think you need to show down Putin to send a message to Xi. You just send a message to Xi and show you are serious by not wasting your resources in other places.
Roman is wrong that Germany on offense against the prepared Czech (-oslovak) would have been a cakewalk like their blitz against Poland—just as most militarily oriented armchair generals were wrong about a fast Ukraine fall to a Russian attack.
I even speculate that Putin didn’t believe his own generals about an easy attack, but did believe US “experts” expecting a quick surrender.
Yet Roman is right that Slovak Slavs were unhappy in the little Czech empire, as were minority Germans & Hungarians (against Trianon) & Ruthenians (Rusyn), and pretty illiterate & non-political Gypsies (Roma). Plus Jews, who were hated as a successful out group, rather than a far group like aristocrats.
Roman is probably, but unknowably, right about the need for moral superiority. Yet that was needed in WWII, and is now needed in Ukraine. And was needed but missing in the 1975 commie attacks against S. Vietnam & Cambodia, with the usual post commie genocide after victory.
Putin’s invasion of 2022 with Biden as Pres., was more immoral than his 2014 semi-invasion (Obama as Pres.), tho similar to his anti Georgia invasion (Bush 43 as Pres). Most Americans demand moral superiority, but “saving lives” (short term) is one morality in opposition to “stopping, and punishing aggression “ which arguably saves more lives long term, so is arguably more moral (superiority!).
Note no Russian invasions while Trump was President.
Roman is very incomplete about supporting fighting Putin “to the last Ukrainian” (willing to risk death to fight for his homeland), OR a peace deal of some kind. As Putin’s army is fighting to the last Russian fighting to invade—tho the Russian version is fighting Neo-Nazis (not completely false. Many Russia hating Neo-Nazis are among the best fighters.)
Roman is also right that the war makes the Russo-Chinese alliance stronger, and doesn’t even mention the growing potential of a non-USDollar based trading system from BRICS and other countries being sanctioned or afraid of sanctions.
Yet Roman ignores the huge message being sent to China—invasion is costly. Very costly. My support for Ukraine, as long as the Ukraine army is willing to fight, is in support of World Peace, which requires borders that are not violated by invaders.
Finally, the increased use of drones is currently helping defense more than offense, but there’s no guarantee that will continue. As war AI bots get more capable, and more autonomous, the Skynet/Terminator scenario becomes more likely. It’s already at 1% or so as my guess.
I am generally puzzled by arguments that "moral superiority" is greatly influential in international relations. China will not be influenced in any way by the moral stance of the US, or western powers generally, in deciding how to pursue Chinese interests.
I think there's a good argument that the US and NATO should have accepted (or pushed for) Finlandization of Ukraine, on the grounds that Ukraine is and was much more important to Russia than to the West. Our defense of Ukraine has killed a lot of Ukrainians and driven Russia to closer ties with China, including helping Chinese military technology.
I think there's a better argument that the US and NATO should have been reasonably accommodating to Russian interests in order to enlist Russian help in containing China, but that ship sailed by 2003 at the latest.
Democratic regimes need moral superiority to continue sacrificing domestic resources, especially military lives, in some foreign engagement. That mostly helps foreigners.
This became true after WW II and the renunciation of colonialism.
The point of demonizing the opponents, whether military or political, is to assert moral superiority.
It is the Unjust, Immoral actions of the Bad Guy, which justify using force & violence to stop the actions.
The amount of support given to Ukraine to defend itself against the immoral aggression of Putin is dependent on the moral stances of the US & NATO allies. China is certainly following closely how much material support is being given to the less-innocent-than-Taiwan Ukrainians. The amount of material support is influenced by net moral support.
(The Good Guys do some bad things in war, too. Which saps moral will)
Those who claim Israel is wrong, or the Hamas fighter-terrorists are wrong (like me), are justifying the violence based on a moral stance.
I would say that there was an opinion climate in Europe where the Germans were victims of the Versailles Treaty (Keynes book is persuasive) and accommodation had to be tried.
Regarding Ukraine, of course there was accommodation to their Annexation of Crimea. The Munich moment was 2014.
that was exactly my reaction to Roman’s piece. the west did acquiesce in 2014 bcz there was no alternative, exactly as chamberlain did at munich. the stridency of his language was the other reason I unsubscribed after reading
Behold! Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons because Russia and the US both agreed to protect them. Not protecting Ukraine destroys the US's future credibility in any analogous situation.
Britain's two key allies in the 30's were France and Poland, and both fell to the Wehrmacht in a matter of weeks, leaving Britain isolated and alone to face an enemy it could not defeat. "Dealt with Hitler brilliantly?" Please.
"I have never been a Ukraine hawk. Early on, I argued that we should be trying for a negotiated settlement. The human cost of the war seems unjustifiably high."
Whether it was clear before this latest invasion of Ukraine or not, surely it is clear now that Hitler and Putin are alike in that they continue to expand via force until they are stopped. This seems the best reason for the west to be hawkish.
Whether there is a gain from adding more moral clarity or not, surely China is learning that even if they win an invasion of Taiwan, the cost to their own economy will be huge and it is likely there won't be much left in Taiwan of value.
Not much left in Taiwan of value! China can already destroy Taiwan with non-nuclear bombing. What China wants is to have the Taiwanese people willing to surrender without any fighting.
The West support for Ukraine sends the excellent message to Taiwan that they, too, would get support were they to fight against an immoral invasion. Because of the immorality of such an invasion.
My understanding of Chamberlain has always been in the context he's unfairly judged in hindsight because winners write history. Future generations forgot the real generational trauma / national PTSD the Great War had on the British electorate and Chamberlain's decisions were overwhelming popular until they weren't while likewise he was acting in good faith based on the information he had and existing international norms. He was unaware of the Soviet-Nazi alliance, WW2 was already on its eighth year of combat and didn't appear to be spiraling up, fascism had already been in power nearly twenty years in multiple nations and for all it's bluster, it was still monarchies, not fascists, that were causing most of the armed conflicts including the UK itself in colonial actions, etc as well as rising Sovietism; TBH fascist nations were outright pretty peaceful comparatively to its existing peers from Chamberlain's (and factual historical records) perspective. He simply had no reason to believe Stalin would escalate WW2 and invade Poland.
Unfortunately Chamberlain died too early to answer questions about the policy years after the fact. He had bowel cancer probably even before 1940, which his doctors helped to conceal. He didn't seek treatment until the pain became unbearable - some said it was just as important a motivation for him in his decision to step aside for Churchill - and by then it was too late, and it may have been a death sentence from the start given the ineffective state of anti-cancer medicine at the time.
Nevertheless, it seems from the record that most people supported Chamberlain's policy and ideas until the invasion of Poland and then other countries - especially Norway - which England anticipated and thought it could prevent, but failed to stop. That led to the Norway Debate and May [1940] Cabinet Crisis. By then most people except those in the Conservative Party Establishment had turned against appeasement and Chamberlain's handling of the war.
Lord Halifax, Foreign Secretary, argued for peace negotiations, and most of the other Conservatives were inclined to follow his lead in the absence of any other prominent Conservative leaders supporting the conflict. The Liberals tended to favor Churchill's position to continue the war, but without the support of at least some Conservatives, Churchill risked losing the position of Prime Minister.
It was Chamberlain who by then conceded that appeasement had been a failure and war with Germany was necessary. His support brought other Conservatives along, Churchill kept his job, and in a few months Halifax "left" the position of Foreign Secretary and was off to be leader of the House of Lords, then after a few months, Ambassador to the United States for the duration of the war. Chamberlain passed just a few months after he played his role supporting the war.
Robert Harris' novel Munich manages to come up with a plot that is interesting despite everyone knowing how it will end. (Harris is a superb writer and everything I've read of his is terrific.) He's on the "Chamberlin was buying time" team and makes a reasonable case for it.
It is a big game with mostly puppets on a stage. Neither Putin, nor Zelensky, or , lol , Biden have any sovereignty. They are all playing their intended roles.
General public takes this puppet show as a reality. Thus living in an illusion.
The Holocaust is what most people know about WW2 and is probably what will be remembered. The tragedy itself of course, even amid the other less well-remembered atrocities of the whole period, inter-war and war, reverberates still and anything that could have prevented it, in order to have left us in a different world, seems like what can only in retrospect have earned that “dealt with the Germans very well.” My vague impression is that Hitler thought of the Brits as one of the few races of men he could live with, even admire - and perhaps thought they would be okay with his plans. It’s hard to figure out what Chamberlin should have done though I’m sure smart people have some ideas. But to the degree that he legitimized or left Hitler feeling confident about expanding the German homeland - well, that’s just a disaster. Because the Holocaust mostly happens outside of Germany, in the conquered places.
I have not heard before that the Germans and the Polish officer corps were ever going to be natural buddies, charges of anti-Semitism aside. That’s new to me.
I guess Poland’s existence was short enough that a historian could make anything of it.
After Munich, Slovak PM Father Tiso was told by Hitler that if Slovakia did Not declare independence, it would be divided by Hungary and Poland. Tiso got a decision from the Slovak Parliament to declare. Hitler wasn’t happy that Tiso didn’t do it immediately. Unlike most countries, far more Slovaks died in WW I than in WW II.
Tiso, and his deportation of Jews to work camps in Germany, was in a tougher place than Chamberlain, with far less power or influence. He’s the key cleric in commie promoted Clerical-Fascism which is so demonized.
The Poles didn’t know about the Molotov-Ribbentrop (invade & split Poland) Treaty. They thought the Germans hated the Soviets (which they did), so were surprised by blitzkrieg.
It's much easier to argue about abstract principles than to be "man in the arena" who needs to make decisions based on imperfect information at significant personal risk. That goes for critiques of both Chamberlain and Churchill, who both tend to look better on close examination. My opinion of Churchill is high even after reading both AJP Taylor and Pat Buchanan's books among many other things.
It's worth pointing out that there is a bit of interesting revisionist history about the Maginot line as a series of physical installations and civil-military fortifications during that era. The problem was less the fortifications, but the doctrine of the French military and the many other social-economic-military distortions written extensively about by Marc Bloch. After all, the successful Soviet counter-offensive in 1943-44 was greatly aided by the construction of super-Maginot-like defenses, and German defenses along all lines were greatly aided by the unparalleled military-civil defensive fortifications built throughout areas under evil moustache man control.
If fixed defenses were a primary cause of French failure, rather than the many Bloch reasons, then the 1940 invasion should have failed because Germany also invested a great deal into extensive border fortifications (the Siegfried line / Westwall). It was that Germany *also* developed a much more effective set of military doctrines and better marshalled civil support that enabled it to roll over the French Republic.
Large and permanent fortifications throughout history are usually (counterintuitively) best used to support the offensive and counter-offensive. This includes medieval castles. They're there to support the attack or to permit time for a relief force than they are to preserve the people manning them. The post-war historical interpretation about fixed defenses was basically what the Soviets did in 1941-42. It was a disaster; they lost more territory in less time since Genghis Khan because of the failure to fortify the borders. It was after they constructed horrifyingly deep fortifications and minefields that enabled them to thwart German lightning strikes and finally go on the strategic counter-offensive.
What Roman ignores is that the Sudeten crisis was largely manufactured by Chamberlain's meddling itself. The meddling is discussed in AJP Taylor's Origin of World War 2.
"I don’t believe that China and other countries would have reacted to an easy Russian victory in Ukraine by lowering their support for Russia. More likely such a victory would have inclined them to draw closer to Russia."
I believe his argument is that we should have accepted the Russian demands that were made before the war (no NATO, etc). One could probably even throw in the Russian peace offer a month in (status quo ante-bellum).
If having accepted those terms, Russia invaded anyway, then the moral view would be much clearer.
As far as I can tell the net result of rejecting these terms is Ukraine will get wrecked and Russia will own at least 20% of the country if not more.
---
In 1938, opinion polls were taking their first baby steps. A British poll taken in the Munich conference’s immediate aftermath had 57% satisfied with Chamberlain, 33% dissatisfied and 10% undecided.
A French opinion poll carried out in early October 1938 had 57% in favor of Daladier’s policy, 37% against and 6% undecided, very similar to Britain’s post-Munich numbers.
---
There really wasn't a lot of public support for starting a war over Munich in the west, unlike in 1939 when it was a lot higher over Poland. Keep in mind to even in 1940 the British and French couldn't even convince the Low Countries to abandon neutrality.
----
"The usual defense of Chamberlain is that Britain needed more time to prepare militarily, and that the Munich agreement bought time. But Germany also was building up its arms, so this is not a very persuasive argument."
From what I can tell the German army got stronger vis a vis the allies but its Air Force got weaker between Munich and 1940. It's hard to say which mattered more, but probably the army stuff helped with the Battle of France and the Air Force stuff hurt in the Battle of Britain. Of course the Battle of France was largely decided by maneuver rather then fighting.
It's also hard to understand the participants without understanding what they believed about Strategic Air Power before the war (the bomber will always get through). Chamberlin was being told by his military people that London would be leveled.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JY_S9X5HdOM
So much of what happened is colored by the German Sickle Cut miracle working in France. It wasn't supposed to, and it makes everything that came before it seem foolhardy in retrospect. If it fails and Germany loses the Battle of France, how is Chamberlin seen.
The best argument against Chamberlin is that maybe the Oster Conspiracy might have removed Hitler, but given actual history he avoided that plenty of other times.
Agreed, my understanding of this POV is that Russia saw the movement towards admitting Ukraine to NATO as the initial aggression. Since admission to NATO binds other countries to come to Ukraine's defense, the argument is that Russia thought it was their last chance to avoid NATO on their doorstep.
I find that to be a convincing line of reasoning. I think the most persuasive counter-argument I've seen is that Russia took Crimea prior to that, which is hard to square with that narrative.
The "NATO on the doorstep" excuse offered by many Westerners for Russian behavior is transparent bullshit. Russia has way more NATO now on its literal doorstep (30 km from its second biggest city and erstwhile imperial capital) than it did before, and what does Russia do? Emit dismissive noises and move troops and weapons from its new Northern border with NATO to Ukraine. It was not and never has been about NATO per se - after all, guess who built Russia's current military industry? - but about not being able to bully and have its way with Ukraine anymore. Fundamentally, most Russian elites (even so-called "liberals") and many of the Russian people have never accepted the independence of Ukraine, and they want to see it liquidated. Putin apparently wants this to be his historical legacy. Russian Z-channels being loudly livid a couple of weeks ago about Ukrainians "celebrating their smelly induhpenice" in public rather than cowering underground in fear of millions of Russian missiles, and these babushkas https://t.me/HUhmuroeutro/33214, are typical of this sentiment. NATO is only a factor insofar as Ukrainian membership in it would put an end to Russian irredentism. If instead of NATO it was military alliance with Mars and Saturn, Russian propaganda would bark at those instead, and Western Putin-verstehers would be deploring offensive planetary astronomy.
I think you stated it perfectly in your first part. I found what AK wrote less clear so maybe I misunderstood but it seemed he said something different.
The rest is interesting. I agree it is important that the public wasn't keen on more aggressive action. Surely not the same but Roosevelt also faced quite a bit of public resistance when the US entered.
Roman’s logic doesn’t make much sense to me. In Chamberlain’s case, he didn’t have the support in Parliament to go to war. You can blame that on him for not preparing the populace for that outcome and I’d tend to agree but there was massive resistance to another war. It’s not clear any politician could have done it. I see nothing similar in the Ukraine example. First the US has no real interests in Ukraine and Russia isn’t a threat to us or most of Europe. It’s an aging petro state with a declining population. Germany alone has something like 3-4x its GDP and the EU has many times its population. Russia in 2024 is not Germany in 1938-9. Germany was a reemerging industrial and demographic power with the ability to dominate the largest economic block in the world: Europe. Today only China comes close and so the US should focus there not on a broken down Russia that can’t even take the whole Donbas much less Warsaw, Berlin, or Paris. I also don’t think you need to show down Putin to send a message to Xi. You just send a message to Xi and show you are serious by not wasting your resources in other places.
Roman is wrong that Germany on offense against the prepared Czech (-oslovak) would have been a cakewalk like their blitz against Poland—just as most militarily oriented armchair generals were wrong about a fast Ukraine fall to a Russian attack.
I even speculate that Putin didn’t believe his own generals about an easy attack, but did believe US “experts” expecting a quick surrender.
Yet Roman is right that Slovak Slavs were unhappy in the little Czech empire, as were minority Germans & Hungarians (against Trianon) & Ruthenians (Rusyn), and pretty illiterate & non-political Gypsies (Roma). Plus Jews, who were hated as a successful out group, rather than a far group like aristocrats.
Roman is probably, but unknowably, right about the need for moral superiority. Yet that was needed in WWII, and is now needed in Ukraine. And was needed but missing in the 1975 commie attacks against S. Vietnam & Cambodia, with the usual post commie genocide after victory.
Putin’s invasion of 2022 with Biden as Pres., was more immoral than his 2014 semi-invasion (Obama as Pres.), tho similar to his anti Georgia invasion (Bush 43 as Pres). Most Americans demand moral superiority, but “saving lives” (short term) is one morality in opposition to “stopping, and punishing aggression “ which arguably saves more lives long term, so is arguably more moral (superiority!).
Note no Russian invasions while Trump was President.
Roman is very incomplete about supporting fighting Putin “to the last Ukrainian” (willing to risk death to fight for his homeland), OR a peace deal of some kind. As Putin’s army is fighting to the last Russian fighting to invade—tho the Russian version is fighting Neo-Nazis (not completely false. Many Russia hating Neo-Nazis are among the best fighters.)
Roman is also right that the war makes the Russo-Chinese alliance stronger, and doesn’t even mention the growing potential of a non-USDollar based trading system from BRICS and other countries being sanctioned or afraid of sanctions.
Yet Roman ignores the huge message being sent to China—invasion is costly. Very costly. My support for Ukraine, as long as the Ukraine army is willing to fight, is in support of World Peace, which requires borders that are not violated by invaders.
Finally, the increased use of drones is currently helping defense more than offense, but there’s no guarantee that will continue. As war AI bots get more capable, and more autonomous, the Skynet/Terminator scenario becomes more likely. It’s already at 1% or so as my guess.
I am generally puzzled by arguments that "moral superiority" is greatly influential in international relations. China will not be influenced in any way by the moral stance of the US, or western powers generally, in deciding how to pursue Chinese interests.
I think there's a good argument that the US and NATO should have accepted (or pushed for) Finlandization of Ukraine, on the grounds that Ukraine is and was much more important to Russia than to the West. Our defense of Ukraine has killed a lot of Ukrainians and driven Russia to closer ties with China, including helping Chinese military technology.
I think there's a better argument that the US and NATO should have been reasonably accommodating to Russian interests in order to enlist Russian help in containing China, but that ship sailed by 2003 at the latest.
Democratic regimes need moral superiority to continue sacrificing domestic resources, especially military lives, in some foreign engagement. That mostly helps foreigners.
This became true after WW II and the renunciation of colonialism.
The point of demonizing the opponents, whether military or political, is to assert moral superiority.
It is the Unjust, Immoral actions of the Bad Guy, which justify using force & violence to stop the actions.
The amount of support given to Ukraine to defend itself against the immoral aggression of Putin is dependent on the moral stances of the US & NATO allies. China is certainly following closely how much material support is being given to the less-innocent-than-Taiwan Ukrainians. The amount of material support is influenced by net moral support.
(The Good Guys do some bad things in war, too. Which saps moral will)
Those who claim Israel is wrong, or the Hamas fighter-terrorists are wrong (like me), are justifying the violence based on a moral stance.
I would say that there was an opinion climate in Europe where the Germans were victims of the Versailles Treaty (Keynes book is persuasive) and accommodation had to be tried.
Regarding Ukraine, of course there was accommodation to their Annexation of Crimea. The Munich moment was 2014.
that was exactly my reaction to Roman’s piece. the west did acquiesce in 2014 bcz there was no alternative, exactly as chamberlain did at munich. the stridency of his language was the other reason I unsubscribed after reading
Behold! Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons because Russia and the US both agreed to protect them. Not protecting Ukraine destroys the US's future credibility in any analogous situation.
Britain's two key allies in the 30's were France and Poland, and both fell to the Wehrmacht in a matter of weeks, leaving Britain isolated and alone to face an enemy it could not defeat. "Dealt with Hitler brilliantly?" Please.
"I have never been a Ukraine hawk. Early on, I argued that we should be trying for a negotiated settlement. The human cost of the war seems unjustifiably high."
Whether it was clear before this latest invasion of Ukraine or not, surely it is clear now that Hitler and Putin are alike in that they continue to expand via force until they are stopped. This seems the best reason for the west to be hawkish.
Whether there is a gain from adding more moral clarity or not, surely China is learning that even if they win an invasion of Taiwan, the cost to their own economy will be huge and it is likely there won't be much left in Taiwan of value.
Not much left in Taiwan of value! China can already destroy Taiwan with non-nuclear bombing. What China wants is to have the Taiwanese people willing to surrender without any fighting.
The West support for Ukraine sends the excellent message to Taiwan that they, too, would get support were they to fight against an immoral invasion. Because of the immorality of such an invasion.
My understanding of Chamberlain has always been in the context he's unfairly judged in hindsight because winners write history. Future generations forgot the real generational trauma / national PTSD the Great War had on the British electorate and Chamberlain's decisions were overwhelming popular until they weren't while likewise he was acting in good faith based on the information he had and existing international norms. He was unaware of the Soviet-Nazi alliance, WW2 was already on its eighth year of combat and didn't appear to be spiraling up, fascism had already been in power nearly twenty years in multiple nations and for all it's bluster, it was still monarchies, not fascists, that were causing most of the armed conflicts including the UK itself in colonial actions, etc as well as rising Sovietism; TBH fascist nations were outright pretty peaceful comparatively to its existing peers from Chamberlain's (and factual historical records) perspective. He simply had no reason to believe Stalin would escalate WW2 and invade Poland.
Unfortunately Chamberlain died too early to answer questions about the policy years after the fact. He had bowel cancer probably even before 1940, which his doctors helped to conceal. He didn't seek treatment until the pain became unbearable - some said it was just as important a motivation for him in his decision to step aside for Churchill - and by then it was too late, and it may have been a death sentence from the start given the ineffective state of anti-cancer medicine at the time.
Nevertheless, it seems from the record that most people supported Chamberlain's policy and ideas until the invasion of Poland and then other countries - especially Norway - which England anticipated and thought it could prevent, but failed to stop. That led to the Norway Debate and May [1940] Cabinet Crisis. By then most people except those in the Conservative Party Establishment had turned against appeasement and Chamberlain's handling of the war.
Lord Halifax, Foreign Secretary, argued for peace negotiations, and most of the other Conservatives were inclined to follow his lead in the absence of any other prominent Conservative leaders supporting the conflict. The Liberals tended to favor Churchill's position to continue the war, but without the support of at least some Conservatives, Churchill risked losing the position of Prime Minister.
It was Chamberlain who by then conceded that appeasement had been a failure and war with Germany was necessary. His support brought other Conservatives along, Churchill kept his job, and in a few months Halifax "left" the position of Foreign Secretary and was off to be leader of the House of Lords, then after a few months, Ambassador to the United States for the duration of the war. Chamberlain passed just a few months after he played his role supporting the war.
Robert Harris' novel Munich manages to come up with a plot that is interesting despite everyone knowing how it will end. (Harris is a superb writer and everything I've read of his is terrific.) He's on the "Chamberlin was buying time" team and makes a reasonable case for it.
It is a big game with mostly puppets on a stage. Neither Putin, nor Zelensky, or , lol , Biden have any sovereignty. They are all playing their intended roles.
General public takes this puppet show as a reality. Thus living in an illusion.
The Holocaust is what most people know about WW2 and is probably what will be remembered. The tragedy itself of course, even amid the other less well-remembered atrocities of the whole period, inter-war and war, reverberates still and anything that could have prevented it, in order to have left us in a different world, seems like what can only in retrospect have earned that “dealt with the Germans very well.” My vague impression is that Hitler thought of the Brits as one of the few races of men he could live with, even admire - and perhaps thought they would be okay with his plans. It’s hard to figure out what Chamberlin should have done though I’m sure smart people have some ideas. But to the degree that he legitimized or left Hitler feeling confident about expanding the German homeland - well, that’s just a disaster. Because the Holocaust mostly happens outside of Germany, in the conquered places.
I have not heard before that the Germans and the Polish officer corps were ever going to be natural buddies, charges of anti-Semitism aside. That’s new to me.
I guess Poland’s existence was short enough that a historian could make anything of it.
After Munich, Slovak PM Father Tiso was told by Hitler that if Slovakia did Not declare independence, it would be divided by Hungary and Poland. Tiso got a decision from the Slovak Parliament to declare. Hitler wasn’t happy that Tiso didn’t do it immediately. Unlike most countries, far more Slovaks died in WW I than in WW II.
Tiso, and his deportation of Jews to work camps in Germany, was in a tougher place than Chamberlain, with far less power or influence. He’s the key cleric in commie promoted Clerical-Fascism which is so demonized.
The Poles didn’t know about the Molotov-Ribbentrop (invade & split Poland) Treaty. They thought the Germans hated the Soviets (which they did), so were surprised by blitzkrieg.
The freshness and idealism of the Poles’ nationalism contrast rather shortly with the murderous madness that overtook a significant part of the world.
See https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish%E2%80%93Czechoslovak_border_conflicts#Annexations_by_Poland_in_1938
For border disputes as WW I ended and before II began.
It's much easier to argue about abstract principles than to be "man in the arena" who needs to make decisions based on imperfect information at significant personal risk. That goes for critiques of both Chamberlain and Churchill, who both tend to look better on close examination. My opinion of Churchill is high even after reading both AJP Taylor and Pat Buchanan's books among many other things.
It's worth pointing out that there is a bit of interesting revisionist history about the Maginot line as a series of physical installations and civil-military fortifications during that era. The problem was less the fortifications, but the doctrine of the French military and the many other social-economic-military distortions written extensively about by Marc Bloch. After all, the successful Soviet counter-offensive in 1943-44 was greatly aided by the construction of super-Maginot-like defenses, and German defenses along all lines were greatly aided by the unparalleled military-civil defensive fortifications built throughout areas under evil moustache man control.
If fixed defenses were a primary cause of French failure, rather than the many Bloch reasons, then the 1940 invasion should have failed because Germany also invested a great deal into extensive border fortifications (the Siegfried line / Westwall). It was that Germany *also* developed a much more effective set of military doctrines and better marshalled civil support that enabled it to roll over the French Republic.
Large and permanent fortifications throughout history are usually (counterintuitively) best used to support the offensive and counter-offensive. This includes medieval castles. They're there to support the attack or to permit time for a relief force than they are to preserve the people manning them. The post-war historical interpretation about fixed defenses was basically what the Soviets did in 1941-42. It was a disaster; they lost more territory in less time since Genghis Khan because of the failure to fortify the borders. It was after they constructed horrifyingly deep fortifications and minefields that enabled them to thwart German lightning strikes and finally go on the strategic counter-offensive.
Today Arnold Kling the polymath converses about stuff I wish I knew more about.
What Roman ignores is that the Sudeten crisis was largely manufactured by Chamberlain's meddling itself. The meddling is discussed in AJP Taylor's Origin of World War 2.
I am ignorant of that argument. Can you remedy my ignorance?
AJP Taylor has expressed the argument better than I could ever. Basically Hitler was an opportunist and Chamberlain created the opportunity.
Thanks.