Is 'rational' really the best term? It doesn't matter what the definition is if one is not using the apt term to describe the observations one finds troubling or mysterious.
My impression is that 'irrational' is something of a more neutral and innocent-seeming euphemism instead of more negatively loaded and culpable terms like 'corrupted', 'politicized', 'incompetent', and so forth.
So, one may be irrational by sincerely pursuing certain goals, but doing so in a way without any good logical connection to evidence about causes and effects or making other kinds of cognitive errors. "Sunk cost fallacy" is a good example of people behaving irrationally, indeed, it is sometimes called "irrational escalation of commitment".
On the other hand, if an institution simply purports and publicly claims to have certain ends and purposes which were traditionally genuinely pursued in a rational manner, but those goals have been secretly displaced by the rational pursuit of alternative agendas and ulterior motives, then the institution is not really behaving 'irrationally' except perhaps to the most naive observer who takes the stated mission seriously without any healthy skepticism.
Instead, you have the institution behaving rationally, but *dishonestly*, in terms of admitting its true commitments and what the people who are running it are really trying to do.
I certainly believe Institutional Dishonesty is more relevant, and negative, than the less negative irrational.
Still, since Feelings are often irrational, institutions that decide or act based on feelings will often not be rational. But will certainly use Big Brains to rationalize the acts they decided to do because of their feelings.
{One could insert anti-feminist "get in touch with your feelings" here.}
An antecedent point is that agreeing on definitions increases the odds of agreement only if the parties are committed to neutral ideals like truth, fairness, etc. across a range of applications for the subject to which the definition is being applied. But that condition hardly ever holds when it comes to contentious issues, because the issues are contentious due to preexisting normative (usually community- / identity-based) commitments. So the question becomes how to intermediate between conflicting groups that have a stake in changing or ignoring definitions when convenient. This is a question more of power and sociology and law than of language as such.
The word "intermediating" is perfect - intermediating institutions arguably are supposed to serve that very purpose, substituting shared normative commitments for preexisting ones. But maybe there's a paradox: the more we need institutional intermediation, the harder it is to get. The larger the gap between those sets of commitments, the less incentive to bridge the gap.
Is 'rational' really the best term? It doesn't matter what the definition is if one is not using the apt term to describe the observations one finds troubling or mysterious.
My impression is that 'irrational' is something of a more neutral and innocent-seeming euphemism instead of more negatively loaded and culpable terms like 'corrupted', 'politicized', 'incompetent', and so forth.
So, one may be irrational by sincerely pursuing certain goals, but doing so in a way without any good logical connection to evidence about causes and effects or making other kinds of cognitive errors. "Sunk cost fallacy" is a good example of people behaving irrationally, indeed, it is sometimes called "irrational escalation of commitment".
On the other hand, if an institution simply purports and publicly claims to have certain ends and purposes which were traditionally genuinely pursued in a rational manner, but those goals have been secretly displaced by the rational pursuit of alternative agendas and ulterior motives, then the institution is not really behaving 'irrationally' except perhaps to the most naive observer who takes the stated mission seriously without any healthy skepticism.
Instead, you have the institution behaving rationally, but *dishonestly*, in terms of admitting its true commitments and what the people who are running it are really trying to do.
I certainly believe Institutional Dishonesty is more relevant, and negative, than the less negative irrational.
Still, since Feelings are often irrational, institutions that decide or act based on feelings will often not be rational. But will certainly use Big Brains to rationalize the acts they decided to do because of their feelings.
{One could insert anti-feminist "get in touch with your feelings" here.}
An antecedent point is that agreeing on definitions increases the odds of agreement only if the parties are committed to neutral ideals like truth, fairness, etc. across a range of applications for the subject to which the definition is being applied. But that condition hardly ever holds when it comes to contentious issues, because the issues are contentious due to preexisting normative (usually community- / identity-based) commitments. So the question becomes how to intermediate between conflicting groups that have a stake in changing or ignoring definitions when convenient. This is a question more of power and sociology and law than of language as such.
The word "intermediating" is perfect - intermediating institutions arguably are supposed to serve that very purpose, substituting shared normative commitments for preexisting ones. But maybe there's a paradox: the more we need institutional intermediation, the harder it is to get. The larger the gap between those sets of commitments, the less incentive to bridge the gap.