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John Alcorn's avatar

Re: "what we have now is actually worse than a UBI, because it has even more work disincentives built in. Under our current set of programs the working poor lose many of their benefits as their income exceeds poverty thresholds. I think of it as a UBI with a tax rate of close to 100 percent on earned income."

Arnold, Since replacement of means-tested welfare by a UBI is off the table, what reforms of means-tests programs might encourage rather than discourage work?

(Any suitable reform would have to be compatible with whatever relevant insights we have from behavioral economics about incentives and behavior.)

Is the incentive problem here intrinsic? Or is it an artifact of bad design of means-tested programs (shaped by politics)?

Is the 'eligibility cliff' fixable in principle by better design? Is there an economic theory of means-tested welfare that is 'incentive-compatible'?

Are we in a double bind because (a) replacement of means-tested programs by a 'UBI + charity' is off the table and (b) means-tested programs that would encourage work are either unknown in theory or off the table due to political economy?

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gideon magnus's avatar

Hear hear. My thoughts exactly. No system is perfect, and a UBI is quite possibly the least harmful. Especially if one accounts for the ability of governments to design more complicated yet effective welfare programs.

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