The Israel-Iran War

Thinking of the Gaza conflict in proxy-war terms.

I think of the conflict in Gaza as a proxy war between Israel and Iran.

As an analogy, consider the war in Ukraine. In a sense, it is a proxy war between the U.S. and Russia. One notable difference is that our proxy did not launch the latest phase of the Ukraine war. Iran’s proxy did start the latest phase of the Gaza conflict.

Historian Michael Kimmage wrote on last weekend’s WSJ,

the U.S. and other countries supporting Ukraine have embraced (but not always articulated) a clear strategy: They have applied a formidable array of military, diplomatic and economic means to the crucial goal of containing the revanchist power of Putin’s Russia. They have executed this strategy with energy and determination, to the great benefit of Ukraine, and its future prospects are bright—but only if we have the patience to stick with it.

I do not see it that way. At the outset of the war in Ukraine, I made the cynical observation that the American foreign policy establishment is willing to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. I would criticize this on both strategic and humanitarian grounds.

I think that Iran is even more cynical about its Hamas proxy. Iran is willing to fight to the last Palestinian. It sees Hamas, and also Palestinian civilians, as cannon fodder.

These proxy wars will be very costly to Russia and to Israel in terms of blood and resources, but what will they accomplish in the end? I do not see either country being defeated in the near term. Both countries are more determined than ever to protect their nations from what they see as a hostile world.

If the Netanyahu government falls, it will probably be replaced by a government that is at least as nationalistic and hard line. Other people would know better than me what might follow Putin in Russia, but it seems plausible that any successor will also turn out to be at least as nationalistic and hard line.

So I do not think that proxy wars are particularly effective at achieving strategic goals. The advantage of fighting a war by proxy is that your own population does not suffer casualties. That makes fighting by proxy seem cheap. The American people are not going to vote out the Biden Administration because it is waging a proxy war. The Iranian people are not going to overthrow their regime because it is waging a proxy war. The respective governments face domestic opposition, but mostly about other matters.

What keeps Israel from escalating the war and taking on Hezbollah, or perhaps even Iran itself? One possibility is that the United States is telling Israel that it must not escalate. But another possibility is that Israel is like a guy in a bar yelling “Let me at him!” but letting himself be restrained by his friends. This way, he gets to keep his honor but avoid the fight.

It may be that Israel genuinely does not like being restrained. The United States has acquired a high tolerance for drawn-out, indecisive wars. Israelis would almost surely prefer something different. The stress they face on a daily basis is very high.

The United States is attempting to obtain cease-fires in both Gaza and on the Lebanon border. My reading of history is that historically Muslims have treated cease-fires as opportunities to re-arm and re-group, rather than as steps toward peaceful resolution of differences. Of course, Hamas and Hezbollah will break a cease-fire whenever they think it is to their advantage to do so. October 7 was a broken cease-fire.

The long-term strategic outlook is unclear to me. Given the relative size of the two states, it is physically impossible for Israel to obliterate Iran, but Iran could some day obliterate Israel. Worldwide, Muslims vastly outnumber Jews. If even a small fraction of Muslims are committed to the destruction of Israel, sooner or later they may prevail.

On the other hand, Iran’s regime is not popular at home. Eventually, it could fall. A secular Persian government might have no use for a mission to destroy Israel. Israel could breathe a sigh of relief, assuming no other major country takes up the cause of destroying it.

Also, the nature of warfare is changing. Conventional weapons are becoming less effective, and electronic warfare is becoming more important. My guess is that Israel will be adept at electronic warfare. Ideally, it will find a way to protect its airspace without having to invade Lebanon. It will find a way to secure Gaza without occupying it.

The October 7 attack showed that Israel’s electronic security systems were not as effective as they had assumed. Like the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, Hamas caught the enemy off guard. But Pearl Harbor awakened a sleeping giant.