The issue is that expertise in reconfiguring the game is precisely what wokesters are expert at! That is why they are gaining power, and those you favor are losing it. The right approach is to figure out not just what the game should be (trivial), but how to get to that game without suffering defectors (people more interested in pulling the ladder up than enacting fair meritocracy, even if it hurts them).
Hayek answered this question in "The Use of Knowledge in Society" but I am not yet sure we understand what he wrote.
Knowledge services two important functions:
Type 1) It creates a standard of thinking, that may be wrong, but serves as a scaffold to develop other knowledge. The derivative may be accurate even if the predicate was wrong.
Type 2) It equips someone to understand new information. i.e. a physicist can observe more things about physics and explain new phenomena.
In the context of "Knowledge in society" there are people who can interpret data and generate new novel innovations (Type 2). But price, which is imperfect, also helps "The coordination problem" using a Type 1 approach. So price is imperfect but sufficient to improve knowledge.
Clayton Christensen described a form of disruptive innovation. Specifically when customer requirements change, in a manner that disadvantages incumbents. An example would be a shift from faster processors to more battery efficiency. There came a time when computers were fast enough, and then we wanted portable. I personally think incumbent knowledge is more type 1 behavior. And disruptive is more type 2.
The rate of change to disruptive innovation, or type 2 knowledge, is captured in part by Kurzweil's The Law of Accelerating Returns. The rate of change represents A) there is unmet latent demand B) knowledge and demand are shifting at an accelerating pace.
So how does this relate to your article? The accumulation of social cred around type 1 or type 2 cohorts is probably fine. Its ok for a Type 1 bandwagon, with low substance, if it helps set standards (i.e. does it matter what the gauge of railroad is, or what phone platform people use, if the benefit generates positive externalities like interoperability).
I personally find type 2 more vexing. If we could build quality social cred around type 2 behavior (knowledge of new domains) that would advance society in a manner that solves the coordination problem perhaps better than price. Understanding this sort of social cred probably relates to knowledge graphs and/or information flows in conjunction with feedback from end-users in the manner Hayek articulated in his paper.
"Withdraw into yourself, as far as you can. Associate with those who will make a better man of you. Welcome those whom you yourself can improve. The process is mutual; for men learn while they teach. There is no reason why pride in advertising your abilities should lure you into publicity, so that you should desire to recite or harangue before the general public."
Or, if you want to keep it concise:
"One man means as much to me as a multitude, and a multitude only as much as one man."
Both written by Seneca the Younger, a man who achieved status that your average "Elite" today will never rival. Even with the abundance of Internet Atta-Boy Points that social media doles out these days.
Such an important point and bravo for keeping it concise! I’d want to see this fleshed out (perhaps in the Atlantic)- how exactly do we reconfigure the game and make it more meritocratic?
The issue is that expertise in reconfiguring the game is precisely what wokesters are expert at! That is why they are gaining power, and those you favor are losing it. The right approach is to figure out not just what the game should be (trivial), but how to get to that game without suffering defectors (people more interested in pulling the ladder up than enacting fair meritocracy, even if it hurts them).
Hayek answered this question in "The Use of Knowledge in Society" but I am not yet sure we understand what he wrote.
Knowledge services two important functions:
Type 1) It creates a standard of thinking, that may be wrong, but serves as a scaffold to develop other knowledge. The derivative may be accurate even if the predicate was wrong.
Type 2) It equips someone to understand new information. i.e. a physicist can observe more things about physics and explain new phenomena.
In the context of "Knowledge in society" there are people who can interpret data and generate new novel innovations (Type 2). But price, which is imperfect, also helps "The coordination problem" using a Type 1 approach. So price is imperfect but sufficient to improve knowledge.
Clayton Christensen described a form of disruptive innovation. Specifically when customer requirements change, in a manner that disadvantages incumbents. An example would be a shift from faster processors to more battery efficiency. There came a time when computers were fast enough, and then we wanted portable. I personally think incumbent knowledge is more type 1 behavior. And disruptive is more type 2.
The rate of change to disruptive innovation, or type 2 knowledge, is captured in part by Kurzweil's The Law of Accelerating Returns. The rate of change represents A) there is unmet latent demand B) knowledge and demand are shifting at an accelerating pace.
So how does this relate to your article? The accumulation of social cred around type 1 or type 2 cohorts is probably fine. Its ok for a Type 1 bandwagon, with low substance, if it helps set standards (i.e. does it matter what the gauge of railroad is, or what phone platform people use, if the benefit generates positive externalities like interoperability).
I personally find type 2 more vexing. If we could build quality social cred around type 2 behavior (knowledge of new domains) that would advance society in a manner that solves the coordination problem perhaps better than price. Understanding this sort of social cred probably relates to knowledge graphs and/or information flows in conjunction with feedback from end-users in the manner Hayek articulated in his paper.
Signaling that cost benefit analysis played no part in a decision about resource allocation should be reason to distrust the message.
"Withdraw into yourself, as far as you can. Associate with those who will make a better man of you. Welcome those whom you yourself can improve. The process is mutual; for men learn while they teach. There is no reason why pride in advertising your abilities should lure you into publicity, so that you should desire to recite or harangue before the general public."
Or, if you want to keep it concise:
"One man means as much to me as a multitude, and a multitude only as much as one man."
Both written by Seneca the Younger, a man who achieved status that your average "Elite" today will never rival. Even with the abundance of Internet Atta-Boy Points that social media doles out these days.
Such an important point and bravo for keeping it concise! I’d want to see this fleshed out (perhaps in the Atlantic)- how exactly do we reconfigure the game and make it more meritocratic?