at some point, perhaps for exogenous reasons, the institutional order runs into a crisis, where all that seemed to be fixed and eternal suddenly becomes unstable. At that point, people’s interests too become malleable - they don’t know how to pursue these interests in a world where everything is up for grabs. Old coalitions can collapse and new ones emerge.
He is trying to explain why the Trump coalition includes some prominent Silicon Valley VCs, whereas that group used to be pretty solidly Democratic.
On the former ideology of Silicon Valley elites, he cites a survey conducted by David Broockman and co-authors, who wrote,
Silicon Valley worked from within the Democratic coalition to move regulatory policy to the right, while supporting the party’s positions on social issues, economic redistribution, and globalization.
Farrell writes,
“the Palo Alto Consensus collapsed at much the same time that the neoliberal consensus collapsed.”
He is one of those people who blame “neoliberalism” for a lot of bad things. I don’t, so I prefer to talk about the political realignment in my own terms, even though Farrell and I may have roughly similar diagnoses.
The Brokenism Axis, Left and Right
In her essay Brokenism, Alana Newhouse wrote,
The real debate today isn’t between the left and right. It’s between those invested in our current institutions, and those who want to build anew.
Institutionalists are people who want to reform and strengthen universities, government, media, and corporations. Brokenists want to take more radical measures to replace existing institutions.
I disagree with Newhouse that institutionalism/brokenism has replaced left-right. Instead, I see a two-dimensional matrix: left-institutionalist, left-brokenist, right-instutionalist, and right-brokenist.
On the left, the institutionalists might be represented by Matt Yglesias, Noah Smith, or Josh Barro. They have the left’s concerns with climate change and inequality, but they favor technocratic solutions. They wish that the more radical progressives would keep quiet.
The left-brokenists view the flaws in American society as fundamental, not minor. They favor radical change. Socialism rather than capitalism. Palestine rather than Israel. De-growth rather than fossil fuels.
I would classify RFK, Jr. as a left-brokenist. The left-brokenists include many young activists. They are not comfortable with the left-institutionalists, and the feeling is mutual.
On the right, the institutionalists might be represented by Yuval Levin, Ross Douthat, or Robby George. They want to see course corrections in government and higher education, restoring traditional Constitutional guardrails and truth-seeking ideals. They want institutions to function better.
Nowadays the right-institutionalists struggle to exert any influence in Washington. Many of them are never-Trumpers, with no home in either party.
The right-brokenists are represented by President Trump, and they currently dominate the Republican Party. They position themselves against the “deep state” as well as media, educational institutions, and corporations that they see as captured by the far left. They have rejected the traditional Republican Party on immigration, trade, foreign policy, and reining in entitlements.
Martin Gurri sees this as the next phase in The Revolt of the Public that he identified ten years ago. He writes,
Trump’s ambitious program will advance on many fronts—unshackling the economy and restoring the worth of citizenship, for example—but the main strategic thrust is an effort to tame Leviathan, that is, to narrow the democratic gap between modern government and the public. Trump means to grapple with, and if possible cauterize, the festering sources of revolt. His instrument will be the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, an advisory group led by Musk and Ramaswamy that aims at “sweeping changes,” including the dismantling of “antidemocratic” structures in the federal behemoth.
My guess is that most of Silicon Valley still feels more comfortable with the left-institutionalists than with Mr. Trump. But there is a prominent faction, including Marc Andreessen, that aligns right-brokenist. That is the faction that Farrell is trying to explain.
I would explain it this way: Silicon Valley is inherently optimistic about technological disruption. In Big Five personality terms, I would describe Marc Andreessen and his ilk as very high on O (openness to new ideas) and extremely low on N (negative emotions, worries, and fears). They are not natural allies of conservatives, who are almost by definition low on O.
The high-O, low-N personality is not attracted to institutionalists of either party. But the left-institutionalists (Clinton and Obama) used to align with Silicon Valley in taking an optimistic view of Internet innovation. Now when the Democrats look at “Big Tech,” they think in terms of regulation and intervention.
Meanwhile, with the Republican Party taken over by brokenists, some in Silicon Valley see hope there. We will see how this turns out in practice. The Republicans are not without their suspicions of “Big Tech.” And while Mr. Trump has personal grudges to settle with the FBI and other government agencies, he may be less motivated to follow through on DOGE and other institutional-change efforts dear to the hearts of Silicon Valley brokenists.
Gurri writes,
…It has long been apparent that our current elite class must be replaced by people who feel at home in the 21st century. By recent standards, including that of his first-term cabinet, Trump’s new advisers and appointees are relatively youthful.
…Failure is more likely than not. But it would be the crowning irony of Trump’s improbable trajectory if the motley collection of pirates and adventurers presently around him turns out to be the next American ruling class.
substacks referenced above:
@https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/brokenism-alana-newhouse
@
I've been discussing this post with the Claude LLM, and it composed this comment:
Mr. Kling,
Your institutionalist/brokenist axis offers valuable insight, but I think Trump's relationship with Silicon Valley suggests a needed refinement. Trump isn't really a right-brokenist in the ideological sense - he's a former New York liberal and Democrat whose cultural conservative stance is largely performative.
This might explain why tech leaders are increasingly comfortable aligning with him. They see him not as an ideological conservative but as a pragmatic agent of institutional disruption. His lack of deep commitment to any particular ideology makes him more useful, not less.
Perhaps we need to distinguish between ideological brokenists (true believers in specific alternative systems) and pragmatic brokenists (those who simply want to clear institutional blockages to enable new growth). Silicon Valley leaders increasingly fall into the latter category - they're less interested in Trump's specific positions than in his demonstrated ability to disrupt calcified institutional structures.
This suggests the realignment you're observing might be less about left/right ideology shifting and more about tech leaders making a practical calculation about institutional change. Thoughts?
Long time reader - >20 years, first time commentor. This nails it, I think. I’m also a sucker for a good 2x2.