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John Alcorn's avatar

Re: "social epistemology has made progress in terms of *processes*. The Enlightenment norms, including freedom of speech and the scientific method, are important tools. So are institutions in which beliefs are contested, such as courtrooms, markets, elections, and academic journals and conferences".

It would be reasonable to ask about each of these institutions in which beliefs are contested: Has the institution decayed in terms of its process role in social epistemology? Has the institution become less reliable in getting at (or nearer) the truth?

The matter is complicated by the fact that a subset of these institutions contest beliefs *and values*, and do so in ways that entangle belief-formation and preference-expression. For example, about elections, Bryan Caplan likes to say that democracy is largely about "what *sounds* good". Individual voters have little weight in the electoral outcome, and therefore little incentive to seek truth about complex policy issues.

One may reasonably ask: Have selection effects and treatment effects in academe in recent decades shifted the academic process towards orthodoxy and away from open and honest contestation of beliefs?

Yancey Ward's avatar

Here is a deal that no censor has or will ever take:

"I give you the power to censor what I write as long as you give me the power to censor what you write."

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