There is always something that could work better than it does. The solution seems to be to make a person accountable for handling every little problem. They are tasked with checking that nothing goes wrong, in any area where something can go wrong. They become building inspectors who are supposed to make sure that people don't build things wrong, social workers that are supposed to make sure that people don't parent wrong, health inspectors who make sure restaurants don't poison people, environmental inspectors who are supposed to make sure the environment does not get degraded, animal inspectors who are supposed to make sure that animals are are not treated wrongly.
Her thesis is that there is an endless demand for bureaucrats. She argues that being a good bureaucrat requires high IQ, the supply of people with high IQ is limited, the demand for bureaucrats is rising, and therefore the quality of bureaucracy is declining. I think that her intuition is correct, although I have a somewhat different take on the market for bureaucrats.
The way I conceptualize it, a bureaucrat is not a decision-maker. A bureaucrat is there to try to stop other people from doing things that could go wrong.
When somebody tries to get something done, things could go wrong. When something goes wrong, it becomes really salient, and bureaucratic positions are established to prevent it from happening again. I say that the bureaucracy forms rules around past mistakes the way that oysters form pearls around irritants.
The bureaucrat is there to say no. Bureaucrats thrive on the responsibility for saying no. But I disagree with Tove K that bureaucrats have accountability. They try to avoid accountability like the plague.
Up to a point, bureaucrats are good. There really are mistakes that can be prevented by bureaucracy. Middle managers in organizations have many ideas, and trying to execute all of them would waste a lot of people’s time and also mean executing some ideas that cause harm. So a bureaucracy should sort through the ideas and try to pick only the best ones.
Bureaucrats serve a useful function when they efficiently reduce or eliminate preventable mistakes. We really don’t want unsafe food to be prevalent.
But there are a number of flaws in the market for bureaucrats. For one thing, bureaucrats naturally try to expand their scope and hire more bureaucrats. Andrew McAfee’s The Geek Way describes the way that executives in the tech industry try to fight this tendency. I wrote about the book and also had a lively discussion of it with James Cham.
For another thing, Tove K is right that we have been increasing the ratio of bureaucrats to producers. She suggests that this is because we have nothing else for some people to do. In that, she echoes my father.
My father grew up in St. Louis, where young boys would play corkball, a derivative of baseball played with a thin bat, a small ball, and only a pitcher and a catcher. I also played a lot of corkball, because I am old enough that I grew up when it was normal for children to play outside without supervision. Today, we have bureaucrats to crack down on that.
Anyway, my father used to look at the labor market (he would not have called it that) and see a trend toward excess supply, which he said threatened society with political instability. To keep people busy, he said, “We need to pay people to play corkball.”
The equivalent of paying people to play corkball is to give them bureaucratic positions. George Bernard Shaw famously wrote “Those who can, do. Those who can’t, teach.” But in fact those who can’t, become bureaucrats.
For example, there are DEI bureaucrats. Or bureaucrats in charge of enforcing zoning rules that stifle building or regulations that hamstring corporations.
For society, having too many bureaucrats is a problem for several reasons. One problem is that they overwhelm producers. The attempt to prevent mistakes goes too far, and they keep good things from getting done.
Tove K points to a second problem. That is, as you increase the share of the population in bureaucratic jobs, you lower the IQ of the average bureaucrat. So the performance of the average bureaucrat gets worse.
But I worry more about Say’s Law for bureaucrats. Jean-Babtiste Say argued that supply creates its own demand. People want to work in order to earn money to buy things, so the desire to work creates demand.
Say’s Law for bureaucrats is that supply creates demand because bureaucrats create more work for bureaucrats. If you have worked in a large organization, you probably have seen this evolve. Two units need to coordinate, so a bureaucracy is created to coordinate them. Then that bureaucracy needs to coordinate with other bureaucracies, so you need a bureaucracy to do that, and so on.
Bureaucratic growth is particularly endemic in non-profits, which are a rising share of the economy. Everyone who works at a non-profit has very little incentive to solve the problem that the non-profit is nominally intended to address. Instead, the incentive is to lobby to expand the scope of the problem and build up an empire to deal with this expanded scope.
In profit-seeking businesses, a company that gets too heavily bureaucratic will eventually lose money and have to cut back or go bankrupt. That provides a check on bureaucracy. But government interferes with this process by creating compliance requirements. These requirements force businesses to expand bureaucracy, and they provide a barrier to entry preventing new firms from coming in and competing on the basis of lower overhead. You cannot execute a lean startup in an industry that is heavily regulated.
If you are a government regulator, one of your alternative employment opportunities is working in compliance in your area of regulatory “expertise.” So your incentive is to maximize compliance costs. Another case of supply creating demand for bureaucrats.
Have a nice day.
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An alternative hypothesis is that bureaucracy results from the interaction between increasing wealth and loss aversion. In richer, more complex societies, mistakes become more damaging for the same reason that hurricanes do: there is more valuable stuff to be affected by both. And comfortable people with a lot to lose become more risk averse, raising the demand for bureaucrats.
My personal experience with this is shaped by my stint in Google bureaucracy: I was, for awhile, one of the ~10ish people whose approval was required to deploy changes to the search product. Each of us was tasked with preventing a different type of mistake. Together we created a stifling vetocracy, but it was hard to justify cutting out any one approval because the consequences of even a relatively small mistake-- say, one that would reduce search traffic by 0.1%-- were so large in dollar terms.
The best mitigation mechanism we had was to task the bureaucrats with making their "victims'" job easier: automating and checklist-ifying as much as possible of the approval process, so that people launching most changes could easily check for compliance on their own, and be assured we would quickly rubber stamp them if the checks passed. That is probably still an underused strategy in many other bureaucratic contexts.
For a geopolitical example of the tendency, think of how famously bureaucratic France is. French life is also famously comfortable and pleasant -- there is a reason for the German metaphor "wie Gott im Frankreich" -- and these two things are probably connected.
I am not sure I agree with the idea that there are too many people and not enough work, which leads to bureaucrats. There seems to be lots of work that isn’t getting done, and far too many people with meaningless degrees that don’t want to do real work, as well as a large number of people who believe everything can be controlled and want to pay others to do it. Those seem to be different problems that lead to bureaucracy.