Fertility Links
Inquisitive Bird on age and fertility; Nicholas Eberstadt on depopulation; David Friedman on declining marriage; Tove K on parent shaming
It’s widely believed that fecundity begins to rapidly decline in the mid-30s, while any decline in the 20s is comparatively minor (e.g., Menken et al., 1986). This is roughly what I believed until I read an excellent paper by Geruso et al. (2023).
…According to their analysis, women’s fecundity peaks when they are aged 19-20 years old.
More importantly, fecundity declines roughly linearly between 20 and 40. Contrary to common belief, there is no sudden accelerating decline in the mid-30s. The drop in fecundity between age 20 and 25 appears no less meaningful than the one between age 35 and 40.
…Though the effect is smaller, paternal age also affects the likelihood of a successful pregnancy.
Fecundity means the likelihood of a full-term baby, conditional on pregnancy.
Suppose that the issue is that as people age, their gametes age, and/or the fetus undergoes more mutations in utero. That would explain why the odds of an unsuccessful pregnancy rise with the mother’s age (and to some extent with the father’s age).
It might also explain why there has been such a dramatic rise in neurological disorders in recent decades. Maybe young mothers and fathers are likely to have children without autism, ADHD, and other afflictions, but fewer couples are having children in their early twenties. I wonder what the trend for autism or ADHD looks like if you control for age of parents when the child was conceived.
Nicholas Eberstadt and others write,
Sub-replacement fertility has even come to North Africa and the greater Middle East. (Contemporary Islam has proved scarcely more successful in warding off low birth rates than Christianity, Buddhism, or Hinduism, much less Confucianism: in fact, seven of the very fastest postwar fertility declines occurred in Muslim-majority societies.) Despite pro-natal mullahs, Iran has been a sub-replacement society for about a quarter century. In Turkey (now officially Türkiye) current fertility levels, like Iran’s, are 20 percent below replacement—slightly lower than in the USA. Lebanon and Tunisia are also sub-replacement locales. In the Gulf, Qatar and the UAE have tilted into to sub-replacement fertility. The latest available birth numbers for Saudi Arabia (2022) suggest the Kingdom may also have submitted to sub-replacement.
The fertility decline is broader and deeper than would have been predicted based solely on the relationship between fertility and economic development.
Countries can veer into sub-replacement with lower incomes, less education, less urbanization, and more extreme poverty than ever before. Today in fact three sub-replacement societies are on the UN’s list of “least developed countries” (LDCs), the grouping for the world’s most impoverished and fragile states: Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal. Other LDCs may soon be joining the sub-replacement club.
So what explains the worldwide fertility decline?
Given what is unfolding all around us, old “sociobiology” nostrums about the “hard-wiring” of human beings for procreation may need serious re-examination. By the same token, “mimetic” theories of “social learning” may merit a much closer look. On the face of it, we would seem to learn more about humanity’s current demographic moment from Rene Girard than E.O. Wilson.
Turning to consequences:
If we leave out the LDCs, our global 15-39 contingent—the most educated and tech savvy pool of future planetary workers—starts falling in 2027, just three years from now. That means fewer 15-39 year olds not just in the developed countries, but the majority of developing countries as well. That 15-39 group will be getting smaller for about two thirds of the planet. Little surmise about this decline.
… By 2050, there will be hundreds of millions of fewer people under age 60 outside sub-Saharan Africa than today—up to 13 percent fewer, according to some UNPD projections. … Outside Africa, the 65-plus group will double (to 1.5 billion) between today and 2050. That means a steady 2.7 percent growth per annum—faster than Third World population growth at the very peak of the 1960s “population explosion”. The upsurge in the 80-plus population—call them the “super-old” — will be even more radically rapid. Between now and 2050 that total will triple in the non-African world, leaping to roughly 450 million.
Why has marriage become less common and why has the effective term of the contract become so much shorter?
The simple answer is that the amount of time spent in household production has declined drastically
In the industrial era, men tended to specialize in market labor and women tended to specialize in household labor. As this changed, marriage changed. Justin Wolfers and Betsey Stevenson pointed out that marriage became less about production complementarity and more about joint consumption. In the 1970s, many marriages that had been formed under the old rules broke up. By the 1980s, marriages among the affluent became more stable, as they were formed under the new rules.
The new-rules marriages tend to take place much later, when both spouses have completed higher education. This means that they get a late start on having children.
I dare to suggest that instinctual parent shaming is the cause with a big C for the demographic crisis. No society has completely eliminated parent shaming and no society should do so. But creating a culture that handles parent shaming properly is essential. It is the measure that needs to be taken.
…People are naturally critical of other people's parenting. People are naturally anxious that other people will be critical of them.
Her point is that we should be less hasty to criticize parental behavior that seems wrong to us. Let the parent allow the kid to walk to school by himself. Let the parent drag a screaming kid by the arm to get someplace.
Putting demands on parents is the same thing as raising the cost of parenting.
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David Friedman's article is excellent. I have a couple comments about conceiving of marriage as a contract for the purposes of economic analysis. Traditionally, marriage has often been called a covenant. In the modern era, we often do call marriage a contract, but then we do not apply most contract concepts, defenses, or notions of breach to marriage. Marriage even in the modern conception is more like a covenant because just as covenants attached to land "run with the land," marriage has implications that "run with the blood" in every state. In the legal world, there's also a dialectic between the so-called "support theory" of marriage and the "partnership theory" of marriage. Friedman does get into this a little bit. Support theory is on the outs, but there are many old cases for failure to support along the same lines that you would see a child support case and adjudicated similarly. Some of the older cases even sound in criminal law on the same theory as child neglect (if you neglected your wife's upkeep and she died of tuberculosis, you're in trouble).
So with marriage we have something that was traditionally an inviolable covenant that became subject to many additional caveats and contracts. You still have many covenant aspects that particularly come into play in the law of inheritance (your obligations and property run with your blood by default, and even trying to override it by will or trust can subject you to various challenges). Today, your duties to your children are conceived of as statutory duties commanded by the state, but you could also arrive at the same point by interpreting them as deriving from the marriage covenant, merely observed and enforced by the state. To add also to his citation of the Brinig article, there also used to be (now mostly abrogated) causes of action against seducers on the basis of alienation of affection, which is the subject of some other law review articles, some of which are cited there. Then you also have to consider the laws against sodomy and fornication which, while always lightly enforced going back to medieval times, could always be used to dissuade caddishness and increase the bargaining power of a party that wished to broker a shotgun marriage.
Unfortunately, all of this makes it hard to analogize marriage to other things accurately. Marriage isn't like a contract because very few contract concepts apply to it. Marriage isn't like a covenant either because it can be dissolved relatively straightforwardly if it is not contested. It's not like a partnership because there is no joint and several liability for all partners or any concept of what's in the scope of the partnership and what's not. Marriage is its own little cul-de-sac of horrors and delights.
My understanding is that risks for autism go up for both older moms and dads. From a 2024 meta-analysis: “The findings showed that older parents are more likely to have children who develop autism.” (https://bmcpsychology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40359-024-02184-9) I’ll admit that deciphering these sorts of articles is not my speciality, but ChatGPT tells me that the specific rate it reports is about 20% extra risk per each 5 years of age (for one parent? both? I’m not sure).
I haven’t looked this up for ADHD, but the two conditions are hella correlated, so I’m guessing we’d find the same thing.