Fertility Links, including a conversation with Lyman Stone
Alice Evans on the fertility decline; Seth Kaplan on communities; Lyman Stone on marriage; Christine Rosen on male-female hostility
My conversation with Lyman Stone, on the worldwide fertility decline. Recommended.
From the 1960s, US fertility fell primarily due to fewer births among couples. In that context, baby bonuses might raise fertility. But today, the major contributing factor is the decline of coupling.
She uses the term coupling to cover unmarried as well as married couples.
the real decline is happening among people with less education.
She points out that the decline in coupling is worldwide, and she is inclined to blame smart phones.
Smart phones and technology have massively improved the quality of personal entertainment, creating both distractions and conveniences. This encourages encourage home-bound isolation. As chronicled by Jean Twenge and colleagues, US teens are spending more time alone. COVID then created an exogenous shock, vastly improving the infrastructure of solitude. Working from home, without the drag of making fun banter by the water-cooler, people may not necessarily develop confidence and charisma. Instead, they become more socially anxious.
Online connectivity enables anyone in the world to peruse books, films and social media that champion gender equality. Women in Turkey, Malaysia and Mexico can ‘culturally leapfrog’ to the most egalitarian frontier. However, this process is notably asymmetric. Male compatriots may rather maintain their established status! As a result, the sexes drift apart.
Evans says that the Indian subcontinent is an exception to the decline in coupling.
Caste and kinship networks are secured through marriage, which remain vital for status and social inclusion. Girls are typically socialised to marry, obey their in-laws and stay put. A litany of relatives ask, “When are you getting married?” Singledom and divorce are both heavily stigmatised.
Gender gaps in smart phone ownership are especially large. Lack of access to modern technology inhibits women’s cultural leapfrogging.
At the street level, urban planners could focus on creating a physical landscape that nurtures social cohesion as a core priority, rather than treating it as an afterthought. This would mean more densely built, multiclass, multifunction neighborhoods that encourage social interaction, civic-mindedness, and loyalty to one’s neighbors and community. Fountains, churches, local associations, commercial streets, libraries, parks, public buildings, and community centers serve as “third places” where people from the same zip code can meaningfully connect. In such environments, children will not only have more places to wander, but parents will be more intimate with and trusting of their neighbors.
He wants to encourage stronger communities, with more personal interaction and more social childhoods. But if he thinks that “densely built” and “libraries, parks, public buildings, and community centers” are the answer, I’d like to see an example where that works.
Based on my experience, cul de sacs work. I have suggested housing developments where in order to move in you must have at least one child under the age of 10. You could keep this rule in place for, say, the first five years after the development is built. Bring a bunch of young families together, and I predict that you will have the kind of community Kaplan wants. I don’t think that you will get it from “densely built” or “public buildings.”
In the ancestral environment, women are not day-in-day-out dependent on men for “provision,” rather, women are are episodically dependent on men, and men especially operate as insurance policies against local resource shortages, protein deficiencies and, crucially, out-group violence. Today, the exact needs differ, but men are still basically insurance policies.
He sees tension in the dynamics between female fertility and male earning power. Men under 35 have relatively low earnings. But that is when they might be needed by a woman who is capable of bearing children.
He suggests that young men can be made attractive marriage candidates by marriage subsidies.
whereas subsidies for childbearing will require a lot of money to get a few babies, subsidies for marriage should require rather less money to get more marriage.
men can be forgiven for feeling as if they were sacrificed on the altar of gender egalitarianism. And although some (such as Andrew Tate) have sought solace in terrible models of masculinity, most don’t hate women; they are simply turning away from trying to be what women want and finding their own paths.
Instead of marriage, they optimize their health, as the range of male wellness fads—from cold plunges to intermittent fasting—suggests.
…far too many men are choosing to spend more time alone; according to the American Time Use Survey, they are doing so at rates higher than any other group. More are also foregoing relationships and marriage. “Only about 60 percent of 35-year-old men are ever-married today, down from 90 percent in 1980,” the Institute for Family Studies has found. “This trend suggests that a growing share of Americans will not get married before their healthiest years are long past them.”
substacks referenced above:
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Thanks for your talk with Lyman, I enjoyed it. I had some technical difficulties and couldn't get to my question.
The crux of the problem is that middle to upper middle class people (men and women combined) have below replacement (and falling) fertility. This causes many issues but at a minimum it means entitlements, which are politically unassailable, and also fiscally impossible.
There are many causes of this, but one big driver appears to female earnings. Women of these classes are choosing to earn and spend money rather than have additional children. We don't have to assume they are spending it in any particular way, perhaps it's hard to afford a home on one income, but they are consuming their younger fertility years producing income rather children because they perceive this as a path to a better life, and its useless to argue with them about those preferences.
If they can find a man to marry that produces income deemed reasonable for the woman's social class (a substitute for her own earnings) she will dial back earned income in order to have more children. However, these men are relatively hard to find, especially below age 30.
Lyman is correct that "fix the entire economy to improve male earnings" is beyond the scope of public policy recommendations we can consider here.
It seems to me the solution here is to increase income to families from a source other than female earned income, though scaling with potential female earned income. A payroll tax refund based on # of children is actuarially sound from a social insurance perspective (taking on the cost of raising a future tax contribute should be acknowledged as a form of paying into the system). So you take line 3 of your W2 and multiply by X% for each child, and send people a check.
This would automatically be a marriage bonus because getting married would mean two people were getting the X% payment instead of one. This is BTW one of the problems with the Hungarian tax incentives for children, they have no concept of "married filing jointly" and so the income tax break for having lots of kids is only worth something if you increase female earnings, so its working at cross purposes. There are several issues with the Hungarian incentives along these lines.
You could have different X% based on the age of the earner. Making numbers up, it could be 10% below age 30, 5% above age 35, and smoothed in-between. Whatever the CBO says will match whatever amount of money you want to spend.
You could also consider a child only someone below age Y instead of 18. I gather that focusing benefits on younger and younger parents has the most bang for the buck.
My only caution is not to get so focused that the % of parents receiving benefits becomes so small that there isn't a strong enough political constituency to support it. For instance, a bonus that only paid on new births would leave myself with nothing, even though I have three young children. Your probably going to have to pay some for existing children if you want it to be politically viable.
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I've read his essay about the U* shape and didn't find it wholly satisfying. It seems that there is:
1) A big difference between whites** and non-whites.
2) A big difference between men and women.
It is true that poor white men aren't having a lot of kids.
But 50% of births in the US are non-white, and it's probably much higher amongst the poor. If the fertility pattern for women and especially non-white women is high amongst the poor then it's a different story. It's more consistent with the data of 55% of children under 18 being enrolled in Medicaid/CHIP.
I bring this up not because it's such an outlier, it's probably a TFR close enough to replacement and more or less what we want to accomplish with the middle and upper middle classes. It just shows me that if you provide enough non-earned income from the government to make marginal children cost-free then people will achieve replacement fertility (the government basically takes on all the marginal cost of raising a child for the medicaid set, Uncle Sam as husband).
I simply wish to replicate that incentive structure up the income ladder (marginal cost of child = 0). Obviously the government is never going to compensate parents for sleepless nights or temper tantrums, but it can at least smooth out disposable income amongst class peers so child rearers don't feel like they are falling behind (and to more fairly recognize their contributions to stable social insurance funding).
*I grant his point about rich people being too small a sample size on the other side of the U, but it stands to reason that if fertility increases with male earnings this continues at very high levels of income.
**It seems like there is no cultural shame for non-white women bearing children out of wedlock and relying on government transfers, but there is for whites.
Internet dating ruined women. They are now only interested in the top 10% of men. Such men may sleep with them, but nothing more.
I've compiled a bunch of articles on this phenomenon here: https://controlc.com/b3843b5a
They begin:
- "90% of swipes by women are for men over 6’0, which does not reflect the importance women place on height in the real world. …What we see with algorithmic online dating isn't a mechanism to assign the perfect match to each person of the opposite sex. Instead, we've created a machine where the top 20% of men mate with many different partners and the top 80% women try to get the top 20% of men to date and ultimately marry them (and not just have sex with them)." Arnold Kling, 24 Sep 23, https://archive.ph/MKrpq
- "Men swipe right on 60% of women, women swipe right on 4.5% of men. The bottom 80% of men are competing for the bottom 22% of women and the top 78% of women are competing for the top 20% of men. A guy with average attractiveness can only expect to be liked by slightly less than 1% of females. This means one “like” for every 115 women that see his profile." Erik Torenberg, 23 Sep 23, https://archive.ph/Ps8pI
- “Most single men on dating apps struggle to even get “likes” from women. Only a tiny minority of men receive a preponderance of matches, and that this disparity was comparable in scale to the income inequality of South Africa under apartheid. In contrast, the match disparity among females was similar to the magnitude of economic inequality found in Western Europe.” Attraction Inequality and the Dating Economy, Quillette, 12 Mar 19, https://archive.is/EvIj5
- "Women Say 80% of Men Are “Below Average. Are women’s standards just too high? A study by dating app OkCupid found that women find 80% of men unattractive or 'below average.'", Medium, 9 Sep 22, https://archive.is/SvBrV /
- Sociologist Rob Henderson cited statistics from a study on Tinder finding that women “like the profiles of only four percent of the men they see on the app, whereas men swipe right or like 60 percent of the profiles” (see 33:30 minutes into the podcast: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-6ZyQKiwMQw).
- 80 percent of men will only receive a reply to their first message one-third of the time, suggesting that a large proportion of matches do not translate into meaningful interactions with the opposite sex. OK Cupid: Your Looks and Your Inbox, 17 Nov 09, https://archive.ph/yse2